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ILLEGAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE LAW
WILLIAm

T.

PLtYm,

JR.*

"I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than. that the
Government should play an ignoble part."
JusTIcE HoLmES

So spoke the Great Dissenter in Olmstead v. United States.' His words
might well be the watchword of the struggle to curb illegal enforcement
of the law.
Illegal enforcement in this country is an evil of no small proportions.
Inefficient, delinquent or merely impatient police officers, who are frequently
ill-trained, occasionally abuse their powers, sometimes from excessive but
misguided zeal, sometimes to placate the popular clamor for the solution
of a crime by producing a victim by fair means or foul. In their zeal to
accomplish results, government officials may lose sight of the fact that they
are the servants of the law, peculiarly charged with a duty to observe its
spirit and its letter. Yet they must beware the sinister sophism that the
end justifies the employment of illegal means to. bring offenders to justice.
The public respect for law, which is the fundamental prerequisite of law
observance, can hardly be expected of people generally if the officers charged
2
with its enforcement do not set the example of obedience to its precepts.
Illegal arrests, both inside the state where the crime occurred and beyond
its borders, are a major example of illegal enforcement. Corollary to this
are illegal searches and seizures and tapping of wires. The practice of the
"third degree" is a still more serious instance. The wrongfulness of all of
these practices is generally conceded, and direct remedies of civil and perhaps
criminal actions are regularly provided for such abuses. This article will
be confined to the abuses named,8 and to the question of indirect checks
upon them-i.e., when the illegal act has been done and the accused is before
the court, held under illegal process or incriminated by evidence illegally
obtained, will the court disregard the wrongful act and retain the case or
admit the evidence?

I.

ILLEGAL ARRESTS

The law, in order to secure freedom from illegal restraint for trivial
causes, provides that, except where the gravity of the offense seems to
*The writer wishes to express his deep appreciation for the many helpful suggestions
and criticisms of Professor Lyman P. Wilson of the Cornell Law School.

'277 U. S.438, 470, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 575 (1928).

'See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (Government Printing Office 1931).
'Others that might be mentioned include entrapment and unfair tactics in the conduct
of the trial. On the latter, see op. cit. supra note 2, at page 263.
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justify an immediate arrest without a warrant or a crime has been committed
in the presence of the person making the arrest, no arrest may lawfully
be made unless a warrant has been issued after formal charge filed with
the proper court. 4 But a considerable number of arrests are made illegally,
because to arrest without a warrant is often more convenient, saving time
;and trouble. Again, there is in many cases a natural temptation or an
actual necessity to seize a suspect while it is yet possible, rather than to
give him an opportunity to escape while the officer takes time to draw up
an information and apply for and obtain a warrant.
When the accused has fled from the state, it becomes necessary to apply
to the governor of the state where the crime occurred for a requisition
directed to the executive of the state to which the accused has fled, demanding
the fugitive's return. But the processes of extradition are slow, complicated, and inefficient. In these days of rapid transportation a criminal
often can keep several jumps ahead of the law if extradition is attempted.
Furthermore, when the crime is one committed by the accused when he was
not physically present in the state where it took effect, he is not extraditable
under the Constitution 5 and the federal act which implements it,6 for he
has not fled from the state. Thus, there are a number of crimes for which
one may not be extradited to the state where the crime was consummated
yet for which he may not be punished in the state where he did the acts
because no crime took effect therein. The classic example is State v.Hall.7
Hall and his accomplice shot a man. Being well advised or just lucky, they
were standing in North Carolina, while the deceased was over the line in
Tennessee. Upon a trial for murder in North Carolina, it was held that
no murder had been committed in that state, and that one state cannot enforce
the criminal laws of another or punish crimes against another state. Thereupon Tennessee demanded extradition, but the defendants were released
on habeas corpus because they had not been in Tennessee and were not
fugitives from its justice.8 As a result, they were immune from any punish-.
ment so long as they stayed out of Tennessee.
"On the general subject of the necessity for a warrant, see 2 R. C. L. 446-464; 2 Am.

JuR. 7-36; 5 C. J. 389-421; 6 C. J. S. 575-608; Bohlen and Shulman, Arrest With and

Without a Warrant (1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 485; Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of
Arrest Without a Warrant (1936) 39 HARv. L. REv. 566; Waite, Public Policy and
the Arrest of Felons (1933) 31 MIcir. L. REV. 749; Wilgus, Arrest Without a Warrant
(1924)
20 Mica. L. REv. 541, 673, 798.
6
TJ. S. CoxsT. Art. IV § 2, Cf. 2: "A person charged in any state with treason, felony,
or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state, shall on
demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be delivered up to
be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime."

'18 U. S. C. A. § 662 (1927).

114 N. C. 909, 19 S.E. 602 (1894) (murder trial) ; 115 N. C. 811, 20 S. E. 729 (1894)
(extradition) ; note (1895) 7 GREEN BAG 201. In the extradition case, there was a
vigorous dissent pointing .out the danger involved in such a rule.
"That this is the construction of the federal law was settled by Hyatt v. Corkran, 188

U. S. 691, 23 Sup. Ct. 456 (1903).
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Less striking but more frequent cases in the same class are the procurement of a crime to be committed by another in a different state, frauds
carried on by mail,9 bombs and poison sent through the mail, and non-support
of one's family which is then resident in another state.
Another cause of dissatisfaction with the extradition process is that, for
one reason or another, governors sometimes elect to disregard the plain
duty laid down by the law, and refuse to surrender a fugitive. It is settled
that the governor of the state where the fugitive is found has no discretion
to refuse to extradite, if he is satisfied simply that the accused is charged
with a crime under the laws of the demanding state, that he is a fugitive
from justice, and that he is the man sought.10 But if the governor refuses
to issue a warrant, it is equally well settled that it is beyond the power of the
courts to compel him to do so."1
As a result of these defects in the extradition procedure, there is a serious
'Use of the mails to defraud is now a federal offense, 18 U. S. C. A. § 318 (1927),
so 1 this large class of crimes is taken care of.
Biddinger v. Comm'r of Police, 245 U. S. 128, 134, 38 Sup. Ct. 41 (1917).
'In Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U. S. 1861), Chief Justice Taney declared
that the Constitutional provision was not a mere compact of peace and comity between
nations who had no claim upon each other for mutual support, but a compact binding
them to aid each other in executing their laws, and that harmony between the states
required that one state should not harbor and protect another's criminals; that the
duty to surrender fugitives was absolute, subject to no discretion on the part of the
state where they are found; that the provision is substantially identical with that in
the Articles of Confederation, when the Confederation was a league of separate
sovereignties, under which provision, by analogy to international rendition, the executive
of the state was the one. of whom the demand was made, and upon whom the duty
rested; that although the Constitution does not specify what officer shall be bound
to surrender the fugitive (see suprai note 5), it impliedly adopted the same procedure
when it adopted the language of the Articles, and this was the construction placed upon
it by Congress in enacting the Extradition Act (supra note 6). Having thus concluded
that the Constitution should be construed as imposing an absolute duty on the governor,
the Court then turns around and holds that it is only a moral duty and that there is
no power to compel him to act; for if the General Government could impose any
duty on the officers of a state, as such, and compel them to perform it, it would be
within the power of Congress to load state officials with duties, which might be
incompatible with their rank and dignity and so heavy as to disable them from performing their obligations to the state; that Congress may authorize a state officer to
perform a duty, but cannot compel it. This seems the most fatuous reasoning that ever
emanated from the Court before the days of social legislation. For if, as was clearly
stated, the Constitution itself impliedly imposed the duty on the governor, there is nothing
unconstitutional in an act of Congress implementing this provision; although Congress
may not impose duties on the states, surely the Constitution can! The truth probably
is that this is another instance of hard cases making bad law. The fugitive in this case
was accused of aiding the escape of slaves. The Governor of Ohio had refused to
return him to Kentucky for trial. And March of 1861 was no time for the Supreme
Court to appear to line itself up on the wrong side of the slavery question!
Since state laws implementing the federal act also impose such a duty on the governor,
it might be possible to mandamus the governor in the state court. No case has been
found in which this was attempted, however. The authorities are in conflict on the
power of the courts to compel the exercise of ministerial duties by the governor.
It is denied in New York, People ex rel. Broderick v. Morton, 156 N. Y. 136, 50
N. E. 791 (1898), but there is no weight of authority. The cases are collected in a
complete annotation in (1936) 105 A. L. R. 1124. But even if mandamus is granted,
it merely changes the form of the duty, and there is no way to enforce it.
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temptation to ignore its requirements and forcibly return the fugitive to
the offended state, frequently with the open connivance of the officers of the
state where he is found. In a number of cases, this summary action has
been accompanied by violence and a flagrant disregard of the criminal law
by those charged with its enforcement.1 2 Cases of this nature frequently
gain great notoriety in the press and tend to lower public respect for the
law, to say nothing of the individual wrong to the accused.
Illegal arrests, within and without the state, must be discouraged. Direct
remedies, civil and criminal, are said to be ineffective. Shall we, then, as
the only, practical means to safeguard individual liberties, deny to the
court the right to try a defendant who has been illegally arrested? With
substantial unanimity the courts have refused to impose this additional
sanction upon illegal arrests, even when the question was duly raised by
habeas corpus or a plea to the jurisdiction,' although a small number of
"Itmust, however, be borne in mind that most of these cases came up on demurrers
to the accused's allegations and his necessarily highly colored account was taken as true
for purposes of the decision.
'Illegal arrest'uwthin the jurisdiction: In re Johnson, 167'U. S. 120, 17 Sup. Ct. 735
(1897) (defendant held even though he raised question on habeas corpus before trial) ;
Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1, 47 Sup. Ct. 250 (1927) ; People v. Brown, 368
Ill. 177, 13 N. E. (2d) 272 (1938) (issue not raised in trial court); State v. May,
57 Kan. 428, 46 Pac. 709 (1896) ; Commonwealth v. Tay, 170 Mass. 192, 48 N. E. 1086
(1898) ; Commonwealth v. Gorman, 288 Mass. 294, 192 N. E. 618 (1934); People v.
Miller, 235 Mich. 340, 209 N. W. 81 (1926); State ex rel. Brown v. Fitzgerald, 51
Minn. 534, 53 N. W. 799 (1892); State v. DeHart, 129 Atl. 427 (N. J.C. P. 1925)
(preliminary motion to the jurisdiction); People v. Eberspacher, 79 Hun 410, 29 N.
Y. Supp. 796 (Gen'l Term, 2d Dep't 1894); People v. Iverson, 46 App. Div. 301, 61 N. Y.
Supp. 220 (2d Dep't 1899) ; In re Durant, 60 Vt. 176, 12 Atl. 650 (1888) ; E parte
Krans, 1 B. & C. 258, 107 Eng. Rep. 96 (K. B. 1823); Rex v. Marks, 3 East 157,
102 Eng. Rep. 557 (K. B. 1802) (both on habeas corpus); Rex v. Hughes, 4 Q. B. D.
614, 14 Cox Crim. 284 (1879) (no preliminary objection); Rex v. Iaci, [1924] 3
D. L. R. 321 (Br. Col. Sup. Ct.); Rex v. McLatchy, [1923] 3 D. L. R. 291 (New
Bruns. Sup. Ct. App. Div.) ; Rex v. Flavin, 56D. L. R 666 (Nova Scotia Sup. Ct. 1921).
Cf. It re Johnson, 40 Cal. App. 242, 180 Pac. 644 (1919) (rule applied to administrative
agencies; petitioner arrested without warrant, found to have contagious disease, so
confined by health officer, habeas corpus denied).
Illegal arrest in and removal from another state: Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700,
8 Sup. Ct. 1204 (1888) (habeas corpus) ; Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183, 13 Sup. Ct. 40
(1892) ; Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U. S.192, 27 Sup. Ct. 111, 7 Ann. Cas. 1047 (1906)
(habeas corpus) ; Ex parte Barker, 87 Ala. 4, 6 So. 7 (1888) (habeas corpus) ; State
v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561 (1856); In re Moyer, 12 Ida. 250, 85 Pac. 897, 12 L. R. A.
(N.s.) 227 (1906) (habeas corpus) ; State v. Ross, 21 Iowa 467 (1866) ; State v.
Chandler, 158 Minn. 447, 197 N. W. 847 (1924); Balbo v. People, 80 N. Y. 484,
499 (1880) ; Mathews v. State, 19 Okla. Cr. 153, 198 Pac. 112 (1921) ; State v. Owen,
119 Ore. 15, 244 Pac. 516 (1926); Dow's Case, 18 Pa. 37 (1851, per Gibson, C. J.)
(habeas corp;us); State v. Smith, 1 Bailey Law 283, 19 Am. Dec. 679 (S.C. 1829)
(habeas corpus); Brookin v. State, 26 Tex. App. 121, 9 S.W. 735 (1888) ; In re Miles,
52 Vt. 609 and note (1875) ; State v. McAnincb, 95 W. Va. 362, 121 S.E. 161 (1924);
Kingen v. Kelley, 3 Wyo. 566, 28 Pac. 36, 15 L. R. A. 117 (1891).
Illegal arrest in and removal from a foreign country: Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S.436,
7 Sup. Ct. 225 (1886); United States v. Unverzagt, 299 Fed. 1015 (W. D. Wash.
1924), aff'd on other grounds, sub nom. Unverzagt v. Benn, 5 F. (2d) 492 (C. C. A. 9th
1925), cert. denied, 269 U. S.566, 46 Sup. Ct. 24 (1925), note (1924) 13 GEo. L. J. 70
(apparently the first case holding that the federal courts themselves would take advantage of an illegal arrest abroad; earlier cases merely held that a trial by the state
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courts
where
The
States

have held that such an arrest was a bar to prosecution, at least
raised by a preliminary plea to the jurisdiction. 4
question of the effect of lack of extradition first reached the United
Supreme Court, final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution and
the federal statute and treaties involved, in Ker v. Illinois. 5 The accused
had fled to Peru, and the President had issued an extradition warrant to
an officer, who went after him. But instead of presenting his papers to the
violated no constitutional rights); United States v. instill, 8 Fed. Supp. 310 (N. D.
Ill. 1934) (the same) ; People v. Pratt, 78 Cal. 345, 20 Pac. 731 (1889) ; Ker v. People,
110 Ill. 627 (1884) ; People v. Rowe, 4 Parker Cr. 253 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1858) (motion
to quash indictment); Lagrave's Case, 14 Abb. Pr. N. S. 333 note, 45 How. Pr. 301
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1873) ; State v. Brewster, 7 Vt. 118 (1835) ; Ex parte Scott, 9 B. & C.
446, 109 Eng. Rep. 168 (K. B. 1829) (habeas corpus) ; Re Walton, 11 Ont. L. R. 94,
6 Ont. Week. R. 905 (1905) (habeas corpus).
Cf. United States ex rel. Voight v. Toombs, 67 F. (2d) 744 (C. C. A. 5th 1933),
appea dismissed, 291 U. S. 686, 54 Sup. Ct. 442 (1934) (illegal removal between federal
judicial districts).
An interesting variant is the question whether one illegally brought into a state is
subject to extradition from there to the state whose agent brought him that far without
extradition. Ex parte Ponzi, 106 Tex. Cr. 58. 290 S. W. 170 (1926) (interstate
arrest; habeas corpus denied) ; see contra, In re Jones, 54 Cal. App. 423, 201 Pac. 944
(1921) (removal from Mexico to California, extradition to Oklahoma; strong dictum,
but4 removal was found to have been lawful).
" As to courts of general jurisdiction, the cases are rare, and vary as to whether the
unlawfulness of the arrest must be seasonably raised or is fatal to the jurisdiction
(only dicta can be found on the latter rule, for in all these cases the issue appears
to have been duly raised). Tennessee v. Jackson, 36 Fed. 258, 1 L. R. A. 370 (E. D.
Tenn. 1888) (habeas corpus: federal court released state prisoner; the case is undciubtedly overruled by later Supreme Court cases) ; State v. Simmons, 39 Kan. 262, 18
Pac. 177 (1888) (later strictly confined to violations of interstate comity, the general
rule being applied to illegal arrests within the state; State v. May, 57 Kan. 428, 46
Pac. 709 [1896]) ; Re Robinson, 29 Neb. 135, 45 N. W. 267 (1890) (habeas corpus).
These latter cases are not controlled by the United States Supreme Court decisions,
which held only that no rights under the Federal Constitution and laws would be violated
by trying a person so arrested.
In England, although a long line of King's (and Queen's) Bench cases followed
the majority view (supra note 13), the Court of Exchequer went to the other extreme
and held that a person unlawfully arrested must be released, and that no subsequent
lawful arrest during such custody can cure the defect. Att'y-Gen'l v. Cass, 11
Price 345, 147 Eng. Rep. 494 (1822). An article in (1896) 32 CAN. L. J. 534 states that
this is the general English and Canadian view, but the only cases there cited are
cases of civil arrests, with which the writer of that note is unable to see a distinction
(see infra note 30). In Dixon v. Wells, 25 Q. 3. D. 249 (1890), Lord Chief Justice
Coleridge expresses regret that his dictum in Rex v. Hughes, mupra note 13, and other
cases had been so broad as to exclude a prEliminary objection to the jurisdiction, but
he does not upset the rule, resting the case rather upon a special ground (see infra).
In Canada, the Provinces are in conflict, some of them following the majority view
(the cases are cited supra note 13) and others holding squarely that they will release
on preliminary motion. Rex v. Linder, [1924] 3 D. L. R. 505 (Alta. Sup. Ct. App.
Div.); Rex v. Suchaki, [1924] 1 D. L. R. 971 (Man. Ct. App. 1923).
Statutes creating certain courts of limited jurisdiction, such as justice courts, may be
construed as making a proper warrant a condition precedent to the court's jurisdiction.
People ex rel. Lawton v. Snell, 216 N. Y. 527, 111 N. E. 50 (1916) ; Harris County v.
Stewart, 91 Tex. 133, 41 S. W. 650 (1897); Dixon v. Wells, 25 Q. B. D. 249 (1890);
see State v. Wenzel, 77 Ind. 428 (1881). But even in this case the requirement is
waived by pleading, People v. Burns, 19 Misc. 680, 44 N. Y. Supp. 1106 (Co. Ct. 1897),
and is cured by a subsequent lawful arrest while in custody. People v. Bradley, 58 Misc.
507, 111 N. Y. Supp. 625 (Co. Ct. 1908).
5119 U. S. 436, 7 Sup. Ct. 225 (1886), affg 110 I1l. 627 (1884).
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Peruvian government, the officer and other armed men kidnapped the defendant and placed him on a naval vessel. He was taken to California, from
which he was duly extradited to Illinois. Defendant pleaded to the jurisdiction, but his plea was overruled. He was convicted and appealed to
the Illinois Supreme Court and finally to the United States Supreme Court.
In each case he lost. It was held that the illegality of the arrest does not oust the
jurisdiction of a court before which the accused is brought, or give him immunity from trial for a crime with which he is charged in a regular indictment. To
his claim that the extradition treaty with Peru gave him a right of asylum, a
positive right that he should be free from molestation and not forcibly removed
except in accordance with the treaty, it was replied that the treaty merely
restricts a country's freedom voluntarily to give him an asylum, but gives
the individual no right to insist upon security there. The laws of Peru
were violated in his capture, but that is a matter between that nation and
the officer, who may himself be extradited and tried for the kidnapping.15'
But since the officer did not profess to act under the treaty, for he kept
the extradition papers in his pocket, the defendant can claim no rights under
it. The violation of the sovereignty of Peru by a federal officer is a political
matter concerning only the two governments, in which the courts have no
concern. It was not held, however, that the kidnapping might not give rise
to an international obligation on the part of the United States to restore the
kidnapped fugitive if the offended government demands it. It has long
been the custom of our government to return kidnapped fugitives on the
demand of the offended nation,' 6 and to demand the return of those so
kidnapped from this country.7 A complication arises when the victim of
the kidnapping is held by a state court, for the federal government has no
authority to order the prisoner's release and the states frequently have been
unwilling to honor a request to that effect.' 8
'Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 5th 1934) (granting extradition to
Mexico of the officer who returned a prisoner without extradition).
"John Bassett Moore, in his TREATISE oN EXTRADITION (1891) vol. I, 282 ff., gives
a number of illustrati6ns gathered from State Department correspondence. Thus, in
1872, this government, on demand of the Canadian authorities, released a Dr. Bratton,
who had been illegally seized in Canada and returned for trial on a federal charge.
(p. 283). On the other hand, in 190-6, the State Department cited the Ker casealthough that case had not passed on the point-as authority for refusing a similar
request from Mexico. 1[1906] 2 FoREmGN RELATIONS 1121-22.
'7In 1841, one Grogan, who had been seized in Vermont by British soldiers and taken
to Canada, was returned at the request of our government. I MooRE, ExTaAniroN
(1891) 282. Again in 1876, England granted our demand, although the man had been
seized here not by English officers but by a private individual, acting in connivance
with American officials, and although the prisoner had already been convicted in
England. (p. 285, case of Blair). The case of Martin was more extreme: a naturalized
citizen of this country was convicted in northern British Columbia; to get him to the
jail at Victoria, he had to be taken through Alaska; the State Department demanded
and obtained his release because of this violation of our sovereignty (p. 285).
"In 1850, England requested the return of one Bullock, who had been unlawfully
seized in England by a Georgia sheriff and returned to Georgia for trial. The State
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The holding in the Ker case that the defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of the court when he is brought before it, by whatever means, and
may not himself raise the issue of the wrong to the foreign government, must
be read in connection with the case of United States v. Rauscher,19 decided
at the same time. There the fugitive was legally returned under an extradition treaty, but was tried for another crime than that for which he was
extradited. It was held, in effect, that his surrender under the treaty was
conditional and for a special purpose, and that the treaty impliedly forbade
his trial for any other crime without his first being given an opportunity to
return.2 0

Here the individual was permitted to set up the rights of the

foreign government under the treaty, and it is ably argued by Professor Dickinson 21 that the same principle which applies to arrests in violation of a
treaty should apply to arrests in violation of international law, and that
the individual prisoner should in each case be permitted to raise the question
of good faith toward the nation wronged. The Constitution makes a treaty
part of the law of the land,22 and thus Rauscher was able to raise the
question of its violation. But international law is part of our law as
well2 and Professor Dickinson asserts that the same rule should apply.
However, if the offended nation makes no objection and if there is no treaty
stipulation violated, it is difficult to see that any principle of international
law requires the return of the fugitive.24
Department referred it to the governor of Georgia, who refused to intervene, saying
it was a judicial matter. I MOORE, EXTRADITION (1891) 291. Likewise, in 1879, one
Cahill was abducted from Canada and tried in the Buffalo Superior Court. His return
was demanded and the State Department referred it to the governor of New York and
to the trial judge. But the prisoner was convicted and served his sentence (p. 292)
'119 U. S. 407, 7 Sup. Ct. 234 (1886).
'In England, it is now provided by law that a fugitive shall not be surrendered
unless provision is made, by the law of the foreign state or by arrangement, that he
shall be detained for no offense committed prior to extradition, other than the one
for which he is surrendered, without first being given an opportunity to return. EXTRADITION AcT OF 1870 (33 & 34 Vict., c. 52), 8 HALSBURY'S STAT. ENG. 452, § 3 (2). A
like immunity is given fugitives returned from other countries. Id. § 19. See also
Arficle III of the Extradition Convention between the United States and Great Britain,
1889. (It may be found most conveniently on page 932 of Gilbert's New York Criminal
Code, 1938.)
'Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation of International
Law (1934) 28 Amf. J. INT. LAw 231. But see note (1935) 29 Am. J. INT. LAw 502.
2-U. S. CoNsT. Art. VI, cl. 2.
"'International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination." The Paquete Habana,
175 U. S. 677, 700, 20 Sup. Ct. 290, 299 (1900).
'Even in the treaty cases, the lack of jurisdiction is waived by pleading to the
indictment. Ford v. United States, 273 U. S. 593, 47 Sup. Ct. 531 (1927) (British
liquor ship and men seized outside three-mile limit, in violation of treaty).
A unique variant of the treaty cases is Dominguez v. State, 90 Tex. Cr. 92, 234
S. W. 79 (1921), notes (1922) 18 A. L. R. 503, (1922) 20 Mic. L. REv. 536, (1922)
31 YALE L. J. 443. American soldiers, acting under orders from the War Department,
pursued bandits across the Mexican border and brought them back; the defendant was
brought back in the mistaken belief that he was onie of them; on discovery of the
mistake, he was turned over to the police to answer a prior charge of murder. The
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The principle that one who is extradited under a treaty is immune from
prosecution for any offense but the one for which he is extradited has no
25
application to fugitives extradited between states under the Constitution.
In respect to fugitives, states do not occupy the relation of foreign nations.
Interstate rendition is not effected by contract on which conditions may be
imposed, but is required unconditionally by the supreme law of the land.
It is not a favor which the state may withhold or grant conditionally.
So, there being no law or treaty provision to the contrary, the general rule
applies that one found within the jurisdiction may be tried for any crime
charged to have been committed there, no matter how his presence was
obtained. A fortiori, the principle of the Ker case would apply to persons
illegally arrested in another state and brought back without extradition. 26
But a number of early cases had intimated that if the state whose sovereignty was violated by the kidnapping should demand the return of the
accused, the demand would have to be granted.2 7 This question shortly
State claimed that defendant was kidnapped and that the Ker case applied. But the
court preferred to presume that the War Department was not ordering unlawful
invasions but was acting under some privilege from Mexico, however informal, and
if the terms of this privilege were violated by bringing back one other than the bandits
being pursued, it was like a treaty violation and the Rauscher case applied. Therefore
he must be returned.
The companion principles of the Ker and Rauscher cases apply to penal forfeitures
of property. Thus, in an early case, the facts were that three American slave ships set
sail from Havana to Pensacola in Spanish Florida, but upon their arrival they were
greeted by the American army (General Jackson's Seminole expedition) which seized
the ships and took them to Mobile, where they were libeled for forfeiture, having violated
the law against American ships engaging in such trade, even wholly between foreign
ports. As with persons wrongfully arrested, it does not now avail the ship or its
owner that the seizure violated the sovereignty of a peaceful nation, for it is before
the court and has violated the law. The Merino, 9 Wheht. 391 (U. S. 1824). Accord:
The Ship Richmond v. United States, 9 Cranch 102 (U. S. 1815, Marshall, C. J.);
The Tenyu Maru, 4 Alaska 129 (1910) (Japanese sealing schooner, whose crew had
killed female seals in violation of law within the three-mile limit, was seized outside
the limit and brought to port; forfeiture upheld). A like principle has been applied to
forfeitures under the Prohibition and Revenue Acts, where automobiles and boats are
seized without authority but the seizure is then adopted by the proper authorities.
Dodge v. United States, 272 U. S. 530, 47 Sup. Ct. 191 (1926), in which Justice Holmes
was careful to emphasize, without explaining, the distinction between forfeiture of
property unlawfully seized and its use in evidence (see infra note 204).
A recent dase has demonstrated that here, too, there is a Rauscher principle, and that
if the seizure is not merely in violation of a foreign sovereignty but of a treaty, which
is the law of the land, the ordinary incidents of the court's possession of the property
yield to the treaty, and a forfeiture is not allowed. Cook v. United States, 288 U. S.
102, 53 Sup. Ct. 305 (1933). See Dickinson, loc. cit. supra note 21.
'Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537, 13 Sup. Ct. 687 (1893), resolving a conflict
among state decisions. However, the case holds only that no right under the Federal
Constitution is involved, and a state is still free to refuse to try the defendant for
another crime, as a matter of local policy. A substantial majority now follow the
Lascelles case. See note (1922) 21 A. L. R. 1418.
"'See supra notes 13 and 14.
t7Ex parte Barker, 87 Ala. 4, 6 So. 7 (1888) ; Dow's Case, 18 Pa. 37 (1851) ; Kingen
v. Kelley, 3 Wyo. 566, 577, 28 Pac. 36, 38 (1891). On the authority of the dictum of
Chief Justice Gibson, "a greater judge than -%Whom never lived," in Dow's Case, a Pennsylvania Common Pleas judge released a prisoner who had been kidnapped in New
York after being decoyed from Canada. Governor Cleveland of New York had demanded
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came before the United States Supreme Court in Mahon v. JUstiCe.28 This
case arose out of the most famous blood-feud in American history. The
Hatfields of West Virginia and the McCoys of Kentucky lived on opposite
sides of the mountain stream that marks the state line. One August day in
1882, a Hatfield was mortally wounded by two of the McCoys in an election fight. The Hatfield clan took the two McCoys and their young brother
into custody and held them in close confinement on the West Virginia side
until the victim's death was announced. Thereupon, the McCoys were taken
back to Kentucky and brutally murdered. Indictments were found, in
Kentucky, against twenty-three members of the Hatfield clan, but they were
safe at home over the line. They continued to make forays over the line,
harassing the McCoys but always armed and in such numbers that prudent
officers considered it advisable to return their warrants with the report
"not found". Rich rewards were offered by the state but none was so
bold as to seek to earn them. Finally, giving up hope of arresting them
in Kentucky, the Governor requisitioned the Governor of West Virginia for
their extradition. One Frank Phillips, a deputy sheriff, was appointed to
receive the, men when they should be surrendered by West Virginia, but
the Governor of West Virginia, for reasons never satisfactorily explained,
refused extradition, resulting in perhaps the most bitter exchange of correspondence that has ever passed between two' governors. The outrages
of the Hatfields continuing and growing more vicious, Phillips took matters
into his own hands, gathered a band of armed men together and struck
rapid and unexpected blows at the Hatfields, returning a number of them
to jail in Kentucky. The Governor of West Virginia, shocked at this
affront to his sovereignty, sued out a writ of habeas corpus in the federal
court. It was refused and the Supreme Cou'rt affirmed, holding that although the fugitive, while in West Virginia, had the right not to be surrendered except in accordance with the extradition law, his presence in
Kentucky and his detention under lawful process gave jurisdiction to the
Kentucky court to try him for a crime committed within that state. 29 Of
his return, and the demand was granted at the instance of Pennsylvania's governor,
not as a constitutional right of the accused but as a matter of comity. Commonwealth
ex reL. Norton v. Shaw, 15 Weekly Notes 395, 6 Crim. L. Mag. 245 (Pa. C. P. 1884).
'127 U. S. 700, 8 Sup. Ct. 1204 (1888).
'Two justices dissented, saying that the Constitution provides a peaceable means of
procuring the return of fugitives, with the object of preventing friction between the
states both from their giving asylum to each other's criminals and from violent invasions
for the purpose of returning them; that while it is purely the concern of the offended
state when its sovereignty is thus violated, its demand for the fugitive's return should
be honored if made.
The prisoners were subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. Hatfield v. Commonwealth, 11 Ky. L. Rep. 468, 82 S. W. 309 (1889). In retaliation,
Deputy Sheriff Phillips was indicted in West Virginia and tried for kidnapping, but
he was freed after a long court battle-from which it may well be argued that the difficulty with direct remedies for illegal law enforcement is that juries judge the act
by its results, and if a real criminal has been brought to justice, however illegally, few
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course, the decision was only to the effect that no federal question was
involved under the extradition laws. The state'might still honor the demand
as a matter of comity.
One important question remained: suppose that not an individual (and
an officer acting without authority is no more) but the state itself, its
governor and its militia, becomes the kidnapper, using the forms of extradition but conniving to evade its requirements. This is a different thing than
for the state merely to insist that it will try an accused criminal found
within its borders, irrespective of any wrongs done him by individuals. And
many cases, in so holding, in effect i-eserved this other question. For, in
pointing out the .contrast with civil cases, in which a plaintiff is not allowed
to take advantage of his own wrong in obtaining service, 30 they emphasized
juries would punish the offending officer. But would justice have been better served
in this case by letting the Hatfields go free?
For a full account of the Hatfield-McCoy feud (from a McCoy viewpoint), see
MUTZENBERG, KENTUCKY's FAmOUS FEuDs AD TRAGEDIES (1917) 29-110.
'The courts will usually set aside service of civil process procured by force or trick
Snelling v. Watrous, 2 Paige Ch. 314 (N. Y. 1830) (civil arrest by trick) ; Bernstein
v. Hakim, 126 Misc. 582, 214 N. Y. Supp. 82 (A. T. 1st Dep't 1926) (service of summons by trick) ; Anderson v. Abeel, 96 App. Div. 370, 89 N. Y. Supp. 254 (1st Dep't
1904), (service by assault) ; Birch v. Prodger, I Bos. & P. (N. P-) 136, 127 Eng. Rep.
410 (1804) (plaintiff met defendant on the street and forcibly detained him until
process could be procured) ; see note, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 612, 616. New York has now
changed its rule as to service by fraud not involving enticement into the jurisdiction.
Gumperz v. Hofmann, 245 App. Div. 622, 283 N. Y. Supp. 823 (1st Dep't 1935), aff'd,
271 N. Y. 544, 2 N. E. (2d) 687 (1936).
This is particularly important in cases where the civil defendant has been kidnapped
or decoyed from his home into another jurisdiction, for "it is the right of a party
defendant in a civil action to be sued in the forum of his domicile, though he may be sued
in personal action in a foreign forum, if found there, if he went there voluntarily. If
his presence there was procured by fraud or force, it does not subject him to a civil
suit, or to the service of any civil process there." Kingen v. Kelly, 3 Wyo. 566, 570,
28 Pac. 36, 37 (1891) (dictum). Accord: Commercial Mut. Acc. Co. v. Davis, 213
U. S. 245, 256, 29 Sup. Ct. 445, 448 (1909) (dictum); Hill v. Goodrich, 32 Conn. 588
(1858); Williams ads. Reed, 29 N. J. L. 385 (1862); Carpenter v. Spooner, 2 Sand.
717 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1850); Metcalf v. Clark, 41 Barb. 45 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1864)
(creditor arranged to meet his Canadian debtor for a conference in a store just over the
line in Canada; he suggested that the debtor hitch his horse in a nearby shed-over
the state line, where a process server was lurking) ; Baker v. Wales, 14 Abb. Pr. N. S.
331 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1873) (plaintiff asked defendant to come in from Connecticut
to negotiate a settlement; when the negotiations failed, he filled out a blank summons
and served it; this would be all right if bona fide, but the court saw a general plan in
the fact that a supply of blank summonses was kept in the office, so it was held a deceit) ;
Lagrave's Case, 14 Abb. Pr. N. S. 333, 45 How. Pr. 301 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1873) (creditors
obtained extradition of a storekeeper who had absconded to France by falsely representing that he was charged with burglary; on his return he was served with civil
process; at that time, and until the enactment of CODE Cvan. Paoc. § 855 in 1936, which
restricts the right in certain cases, New York permitted service of civil process on
persons brought there by extradition, Adriance v. Lagrave, 59 N. Y. 110 [1874]; but
since the extradition was fraudulently procured, the creditors who participated in the
fraud were prevented from serving him); Garabettian v. Garabettian, 206 App. Div.
502, 201 N. Y. Supp. 548 (1st Dep't 1923) ; Stein v. Valkenhuysen, El. BI. & El. 65, 120
Eng. Rep. 431 (1858). Cf. Phelps v. Goddard, 1 Tyler 60 (Vt. 1801) (damages allowed
against those who decoyed a debtor into New York where he was sued in a civil action
which was barred by lapse of time in Vermont but not in New York).
The same rule applies to civil proceedings in rem. In Moynahan v. Wilson, Fed. Cas.
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that the state was guilty of no wrong. 3'
This question came before the Supreme Court in Pettibone v. Nichols. 2
Like the Mahon case, this arose out of an era of unbridled lawlessness, a
long drawn out labor war in which murder seems to have been the normal
and usual weapon of both sides. Ex-Governor Steunenberg of Idaho, who
had used troops to suppress a mine strike during his term, was killed by
a bomb planted in his gate. The man who planted the bomb was captured
and told a lurid tale of a great plot to murder governors, judges and others
who had opposed the union. He accused Haywood, Moyer and Pettibone
of complicity in the plot. These men were leaders of the radical Western
Federation of Miners and had been in Colorado at the time of the crime,
hence were not legally extraditable as "fugitives" from Idaho. But the
Idaho authorities presented incorrect affidavits8 3 to their governor to the
effect that these men had been in Idaho and were fugitives from its justice.
The Governor of Idaho, though later charged with knowledge of the falsity,
made demand on the Governor of Colorado, who also was said to have been
well aware of the truth. The arrest of the men on the extradition warrants
was delayed until Saturday night, when judges and lawyers were not
readily available-for as long as the men were in Colorado, they could be
released on proof in court that the requisites of extradition had not been
No. 9897, 2 Flip. 130 (C. C. E. D. Mich. 1887), defendant had brought plaintiff's horse
from a bailee; plaintiff wrote defendant that he had already arranged a match race and
would lose a substantial wager unless defendant brought the mare into the state
for the race; defendant was a good fellow, and he sent the horse, which was attached
in replevin upon its arrival; the attachment was set aside. In Houghton v. May, 22
Ont. L. R. 434 (1910), a judgment creditor in Canada procured the setting adrift of
his debtor's steamer on the American side, and he levied execution when it floated to
the other bank. The levy was set aside. See also (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 439.
nMahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 706, 8 Sup. Ct. 1204, 1207 (1888) ; State v. Ross,
21 Iowa 467, 471 (1866) ; People v. Rowe, 4 Parker Cr. 253, 254 (N. Y. Super. Ct.
1858) ; Lagrave's Case, 14 Abb. Pr. N. S. 333, 343 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1873) ; Kingen v.
Kelley, 3 Wyo. 566, 570-1, 28 Pac. 36, 37-38, 15 L. R. A. 177 (1891).
8203 U. S. 192, 27 Sup. Ct. 111, 7 Ann. Cas. 1047 (1906), noted (1907) 16 YALE L. J.
347. Habeas corpus proceedings were brought in both the state and federal courts, and
the release of the prisoners was denied in each case. Appeals from both actions were
argued together in the .Supreme Court. The state court decision is In re Moyer, 12 Ida.
250, 85 Pac. 897, 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 227 (1906).
With this case, compare People v. Pratt, 78 Cal. 345, 20 Pac. 731 (1889), in which
the accused escaped to Japan. The United States had no extradition treaty with Japan,
and its policy in such a case was not to request extradition. So the Governor, who
concededly had no authority to deal with foreign nations, made the request himself,
and it was granted. The court held that even conceding that a wrong was done the
defendant by the Governor, he may be tried by the court when found within the state.
"The Governor of the state cannot oust the courts ... of their right to try an individual
charged with an offense over which they have jurisdiction, because of the fact that
he has been instrumental in having the defendant there, by violation of his personal
rights. It will not do to say that a fugitive from justice can escape the punishment for
his crime because the Governor of a state may have violated some law. The people
of a state are not bound by the illegal act of their Governor, nor should they be."
78 Cal. at 349.
23The allegations of the petition for habeas corpus were taken as true for purposes of
this appeal.
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met.
It was claimed that they were rushed out of the state on a special
train guarded by the militia, before any court action could be 'taken to protect
them.
The case attracted nation-wide attention. The prisoners engaged Clarence
Darrow as their chief counsell and William E. Borah, then a newly elected
Senator about to take his seat, led the prosecution. The first move of the
defense, the only one which concerns us here, was a test of the state's right
to hold the prisoners for trial when the state itself was the kidnapper. Denied
release by both state and federal courts, appeals were taken to the Supreme
Court,3 5 but the Court held that once the accused is within the jurisdiction
in which he is charged with crime, the extradition warrant, if any, has
served its function and the court will not look to the manner of his arrest
and rendition. This is equally true when the power of the state effects the
illegal arrest and when it is done by an individual. The crime of the accused
is not purged thereby, and when before the court he must stand trial.3 6
Thus it is apparent that, by the great weight of authority, the court before
which a defendant is brought, however illegally he may have been seized,
locally or abroad, will not hesitate to take advantage of his presence and
will try him. The interest of society requires that crime be punished, and
all that the defendant is entitled to demand is a fair trial by a court having
jurisdiction of the subject matter, in which he has an opportunity of know37
ing the charge and of being fully heard.
When a resident is indicted or is brought before the committing magistrate, the one really material inquiry is whether there is probable cause for
'Either in the federal court, Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 94, 6 Sup. Ct. 291, 299
(1885), or in the state court, Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, 4 Sup. Ct. 544 (1884).
'Supra note 32. Justice McKenna dissented.
"Haywood and Pettibone were acquitted, the terrorist's confession being the only
substantial evidence against them. The prosecution of Moyer was then dropped.
DARRow, THE STORY OF My LIFE (1932) 155, 169, 171.
Radicals asserted that the Supreme Court in the Pettibone case had legalized the
kidnapping of fugitives from justice, and the editor of the Socialist Appeal to Reasot
decided to test the question "whether there is one law for the rich corporation and
another for the poor man". For his test, he selected the case of. ex-Governor Taylor of
Kentucky. Taylor had been removed as Governor by the Legislature, under a law
put through by his defeated rival, who thereupon was named Governor; but befdre
the latter (Gov. Goebel) took over, he was shot by a person unknown, from the
State House window; Taylor was accused of complicity, fled to Indiana; the Governor
of Indiana refused extradition. The editor one Warren, placed on his mailing envelopes
an offer of $1,000 reward to anyone who would kidnap Taylor and return him to
Kentucky. His "test" ran afoul of the law against placing defamatory matter on the
outside of mailing matter, and Warren was convicted. Warren v. United States, 183
Fed. 718, 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 800 (C. C. A. 8th 1910). Darrow defended, but withdrew
from the case and let Warren argue for himself, when the latter insisted on pressing
the argument that kidnapping of fugitives had been legalized (but the court wholly
,ignored this point). The case has interest as demonstrating the false impression that
the public may get when the courts take advantage of illegal acts of those charged
with law enforcement.
"Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 7 Sup. Ct. 225 (1886) ; Regina v. Hughes, 4 Q. B. D.
614, 14 Cox Crim. 284 (1879).
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his commitment and trial. This is the same inquiry that would have been
made if a warrant had been sought before bringing him in, and no more
is necessary for the protection of the accused. A stronger practical argument
on the other side can be made where the accused is brought illegally from
another state. For, until trial, we must presume him innocent and, unlike
a resident, he has been brought to trial before a foreign tribunal, governed by
laws unknown to him, separated from his friends, from his witnesses, confined among strangers who know him only as an accused outlander whatever
his reputation may have been at home.38 To continue the presumption of
innocence, he may never have been in the state where he stands accused,
yet he has had no opportunity to demonstrate this to his own governor or
his home courts. At first blush there is force in this argument, but it must
be borne in mind that if he had been extradited, he would be in the same
position, for these objections are inherent in our system which requires that
the criminal defendant, unlike the civil defendant, must be tried where the
crime is alleged to have occurred. An indictment duly found is all the
protection a resident or a non-resident can claim even when all is lawful, for
(apart from "discretionary" abuses by the governor) extradition is then
virtually automatic.3 9
II.

ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE

While it is almost universally held that a person illegally arrested, by
no matter how gross a .violation of personal liberty and the public peace,
will not be released on this account if probable cause for his detention
appears, the admissibility of evidence obtained by a violation of law is not so
freely conceded. Rather, it is a subject on which the most bitter controversy
has raged for a quarter of a century. We should hesitate to add to the
already great volume of legal literature on the subject had it not once more
become a burning question in New York. 40
A.

Scope of the Constitutional Provzision

It is a basic principle of Anglo-American liberty that our "persons, houses,
papers, and effects" shall be secure from unreasonable search and seizure."
Under certain circumstances, no search warrant is required, when a search
'See Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean 121, 136 (C. C. D. Ill. 1842).
'It must be conceded, however, that on the one question of establishing his identity,
the position of the accused is rendered worse by his removal without extradition.
"The Constitutional Convention of 1938 bitterly debated the question, finally refused
to exclude such evidence. The Legislature .by the time this appears should have passed
one of the bills referred to, infra note 94, adopting completely or partially the rule
excluding illegally obtained evidence. (Note: Both bills have been shelved for this
session.)
1
4 U. S. CoNsr., 4th Amendment. Similar language is now found in the constitution of
every state. New York was the last to adopt it (CoNsT. 1938, Art. I, § 12), having
previously relegated this principle to a statute (CIvIL RIGHTs LAW § 8).
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without a warrant is reasonable. 42 When a warrant is necessary, it must be
duly issued by a court, upon an affidavit that there is probable cause to
believe that certain described property will be found. General warrants
to search for and seize books and papers and other things lawfully possessed,
though of evidential value, are not reasonable or lawful. 43 Warrants are
justified only where a right of search and seizure may be found in the interest
of the public or of the complainant in the property to be seized, or where
a valid exercise of the police power makes possession of the property
unlawful.

44

One's person may be searched only upon a warrant, except that when one
is lawfully arrested, an officer may then search him and seize anything on
his person or under his immediate control which may be useful as evidence
of the crime for which he is arrested. 45 An arrest unlawful in its inception,
however, is not made lawful by what is discovered by searching, 46 and a
search pursuant to an unlawful arrest is likewise unlawful.
'See the full discussion in United States v. Snyder. 278 Fed. 650 (N. D. W. Va. 1922).

"Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765) ; Gouled v.

United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921); State v. Sheridan, 121 Iowa
164, 96 N. W. 730 (1903). Warrants to tap wires, such as are now provided for in.
New York, are inconsistent with this principle but have express constitutional authorization. N. Y. CoNsT. (1938) Art. I, § 12.

"See Gouled v. United States, supra note 43. The Court gives as examples: burglar
tools, weapons, stolen or forfeited property, property subject to tax and the books required
by law to be kept as to them, counterfeit money, and gambling implements.

See also

Lefkowitz v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 52 (C. C. A. 2d 1931), aff'd, 285 U. S. 452, 52
Sup. Ct. 420 (1932).
See the statutory enumerations in 18 U. S. C. A. § 612 and N. Y. CODE CraM. PROC.
§ 792.
Although a search
'People v. Chiagles, 237 N. Y. 193, 142 N. E. 583 (1923).
warrant may not issue for purely evidentiary articles (see supra note 43), a search
in the course of an arrest may properly result in the seizure of evidence. judge Cardozo
thus rationalizes the rule: An officer making a lawful arrest may properly disarm his
prisoner; for this purpose a search is necessary and lawful; and whatever is found
by a lawful search he may retain if it is connected with the crime.
A general exploratory search of the room where the arrest is made is not justified
under this principle. Lefkowitz v. United States, supra note 44. But articles exposed
to view in the room may be seized if the officers are present pursuant to a lawful
arrest. Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192, 48 Sup. Ct. 74 (1927).
"The American Law Institute's Model Code of Criminal Procedure, however, in
§ 21 (b) makes an arrest lawful if a felony has in fact been committed by the one
arrested, irrespective of the officer's probable cause for believing it at the time. This*
section is in force, in substance, in at least seventeen states: ALA. CODE ANN. (Michie
1928) § 3263; Aiz. REv. CODE ANN. (Struckmeyer 1938) § 4937; CAL. PEN. CODE
(Deering 1937) § 836; IDA. CODE ANN. (1932) § 19-603; LA. CODE CluM. PROC. ANN.
(Dart 1932) art. 60: MicH. Comp. LAws (1929) § 17149; MINN. STAT. (Mason 1927)
§ 10570; Miss. CODE ANN. (1930) § 1227; MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland 1935) § 11753; NEv. Coiip. LAws (Hillyer 1929) § 10751; N. Y. CODE CRIM.
PRoc. § 177; N. D. Coms'. LAws ANN. (1913) § 10567; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1937) tit.
27, § 196; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 13-2111; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) § 4553;
TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams 1934) § 11536; UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 105-13-3.
The same rule is adopted by case law in Missouri. State v. Whitley, 183 S. W. 317
(1916), but such cases are rare. The rule does not apply to misdemeanors.
Where this rule is inapplicable, it is held that "although the defendant ought to have
been arrested, and in fact was arrested, such arrest was not warranted" because the
officer lacked probable cause for the arrest when he made it.
The question of whether the constitutional meaning of "reasonable search" will
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A house or place of business may not be searched without a warrant. 47
This principle has been repeatedly enunciated by champions of liberty, notably
by Lord Chatham in Parliament just before the American Revolution: "A
man's house is his castle ;48 it may be a straw hut, the wind may whistle
49
around it, the rain may enter it, but the King cannot."
A mere trespass to land, other than the building where one dwells or does
business, or the immediate surroundings thereof, is not a search within the
meaning of the Constitution. 0 Therefore, officers trespassing in open fields,
orchards, stables, and the like may be liable for damages, but they are not
guilty of an unconstitutional search-a rule which is of great importance
where evidence secured by a technical "search" is excluded.51 Furthermore,
a "search" implies a prying into hidden places for what is concealed, and
when actions or articles are visible to the eye, no "search" is committed in
their discovery, even though the officer be guilty of the most reprehensible
spying and window-peeping. 52 It is immaterial that a flashlight or searchexpand to meet this expanded statutory meaning of "lawful arrest" is fully considered
in tWaite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons (1933) 31 MIcH. L. RaV. 749.
' Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925) (it is not enough
that the officer have probable cause; a warrant is necessary); Silverthorne Lumber
Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 (1920) (place of business) (even
though the papers could have been subpoenzed because the corporation could not claim
privilege, the seizure was unlawful).
"This expression is likewise found in the famous speech of James Otis in 1761, quoted
in 2 WATSON, THE CONSTITUTION (1910) 1416, at 1418. It probably originated with
Lord Coke. Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1605).

"Nevertheless, it has been judicially declared that a nudist camp in a clearing in
the forest is not one's castle. People v. Ring, 267 Mich. 657, 255 N. W. 373 (1934).
But compare Chapin v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. 477, 296 S. W. 1095 (1927) (tent held
to be a dwelling house).
'The protected area is defined as the house or place of business and those things
immediately connected therewith (gardens, outhouses, and appurtenances necessary for
the domestic comfort of the dwelling or place of business),

sometimes called the

"curtilage". Worth v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. 288, 12 S.W. (2d) 582 (1928).
"Hester v. United States, 265 U. S.57, 44 Sup. Ct. 445 (1924) (open field) ; United
States v. McBride, 287 Fed. 214 (S.D. Ala. 1922), cert. den., 261 U. S.614, 43 Sup.
Ct. 359 (1923) (stable); Guaresimo v. United States, 13 F. (2d) 848 (C. C. A. 6th

1926) (garage and barns, not proved appurtenant to house); Koth v. United States,

16 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 9th 1926) (still found quarter mile from house); Dulek v.

United States, 16 F. (2d) 275 (C. C. A. 6th 1926) (cabin in swamp, not used as
dwelling) ; Schnorenberg v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 38 (C. C. A. 7th 1927) (barn
and chicken coop) ; Brent v. Commonwealth, 194 Ky. 504, 240 S. W. 45 (1922) (still
in woods); State v. Ladue, 73 Mont. 535, 237 Pac. 495 (1925) (still in the open);
Eversole v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. 567, 294 S. W. 210 (1927) (barn). But compare
People v. Lind, 18 N. E. (2d) 189 (Ill. 1938) (hen-house) ; People v. Brocamp, 307
II. 448, 138 N. E. 728 (1923) (officers dug in passage-way under cottage).

OUnited States v. Lee, 274 U. S.559, 563, 47 Sup. Ct. 746 (1927) (examination of
boat by searchlight before boarding it, revealing that smuggling was being committed,
made the subsequent arrest and search proper); Smith v. United States, 2 F. (2d)
715 (C. C. A. 4th 1924) (flashlight turned on rear floor of parked automobile) ; Cohn

v. State, 120 Tenn. 61, 109 S.W. 451 (1907) (officers removed brick in saloon wall
and looked through) ; Hunter v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. 252, 12 S. W. (2d) 581 (1929)
(window-peeping by officer); State v. Basil, 126 Wash. 155, 217 Pac. 720 (1923)

(window).
"The eye cannot by the law of England be guilty of a trespass."
in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (1765).

Lord Camden
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light is used, for there is no right in the privacy afforded by darkness. 53
54
Eavesdropping also is not a "search".
Likewise, the doctrine of the Six Carpenters' Case, 5 although it operates
to make the officers civilly liable as trespassers ab initio when they enter a
building under a valid search warrant and abuse their authority, does not
have the effect of making the search and seizure unconstitutional.56 The
constitutional guaranty is not co-extensive with the definition of a civil
trespass.
Automobiles and vessels may be searched without a warrant, provided
the officer had probable cause. 57 For such vehicles are mobile and may be
far away before a warrant can be obtained.5
Sealed letters and sealed packages in the mail are as fully guarded from
inspection, except as to their outward appearance, and are as fully protected as if retained in the sender's possession, and may be opened only
pursuant to a proper warrant. 59
But the constitutional protection has been held not to extend to such
intangible, things as messages traveling on telegraph or telephone wires, G
on the theory that there is no "search" or "seizure" but a simple use of
the sense of hearing. Although there was a physical tapping of the wires,
the Court refused to indulge in the fiction that a wire leading many miles
from a home or office was a part of it. Wire-tapping might be made unlawful
by statute, but it is not unconstitutional. It is a penal offense in many states,
as is the revelation of information thereby discovered. 61 When Congress
States v. Lee, and Smith v. United States, supra note 52.
"People v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 166 (1874); Commonwealth v. Everson, 123 Ky. 330,
96 S. W. 460 (1906) (the landlady at the keyhole) ; DeLore v. Smith, 67 Ore. 304, 136
'United

Pac. 13 (1913)

(1929)

(party line); Hunter v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. 252, 12 S. W. (2d) 581

(officer listening at window).

'8 Coke 146a, 77 Eng. Rep. 695 (1611).
'McGuire v. United States, 273 U. S. 95, 47 Sup. Ct. 259 (1927) (liquor seized under
valid search warrant; officers, by an "illegal and oppressive act", destroyed all except
some samples; held that the fiction is only applied as a rule of civil liability, and it
will not be extended to exclude the use of evidence by the Government; the opinion
is most instructive as showing how the Court sometimes gags on its own rule, for
everything said in this opinion could be applied to the rule as a wholel) The contrary
had been held in United States v. Cooper, 295 Fed. 709 (D. Mass. 1924).
'Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 45 Sup. Ct. 280 (1925) ; People v. Schaub,
279 Mich. 457, 272 N. W. 867 (1937). It would be unreasonable to permit automobiles
to be searched without probable cause, so such searches are unlawful. Gambino v.
United States, 275 U. S. 310, 48 Sup. Ct. 137 (1927) ; Hughes v. State 145 Tenn. 544,
238 S. W. 588 (1922).
'Because of the greater sanctity of persons and houses, the courts are unwilling to
apply this reasoning to them, although persons and articles in houses may be just as
mobile. Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925).
'EX parte Jackson, 96 U. 5. 727, 733 (1877).
'Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. 5. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928).
'E.g.N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1423 (6). Since this is in the article on Malicious Mischief,
it has generally been assumed not to apply to police officers, and it was so held in
People v. Hebbard, 96 Misc. 617, 620, 162 N. Y. Supp. 80 (Sup. Ct. 1916). Cf. Wass v.
Stephens, 128 N. Y. 123, 28 N. E. 21 (1891), construing another subdivision of the
same section.
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took over the regulation of wire communications in 1934, it adopted such a
provision,6 2 which makes criminal, subject to severe penalties, 63 the interception of such communications by any person, including an officer. 64 No
provision is made for warrants; it is unlawful under all circumstances. In
New York, where wire-tapping by officers had formerly been unrestricted, 5
the 1938 Constitutional Convention adopted a provision requiring a court
order to be obtained for tapping wires, the order to be granted upon showing
reasonable cause to believe that evidence of crime may thus be obtained.6
But there remains the anomaly that officers acting under a lawful state
warrant will be committing a federal felony !67
The constitutional provisions as to search and seizure are restrictions
on the government, not on individuals, and hence trespasses by private individuals do not violate the Constitution, if not instigated or participated in
by officers.68 The Federal Bill of Rights does not apply to state governments, 69 so state officers do not violate, the Federal Constitution when they
search, 70 unless they act in concert with federal authorities ;71 nor do federal
'Communications Act of 1934, § 605; 47 U. S. C. A. § 605 (Supp. 1938).
Maximum fine of $10,000, imprisonment of two years. or both. 47 U. S. C. A. § 501
(Supp. 1938).
"Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1937), rev'g 90 F. (2d)
630 (C. C. A. 2d 1937).
"Supra note 61.
IN. Y. CoNsr. (1938) Art. I, § 12. Contrast the fact that search warrants may not
be issued solely for the purpose of getting evidence, supra note 43.
"Whether this clause of the federal act applies only to interstate communications is
still in dispute. But since it is not the nature of the wire but that of the communication
that is material, an officer would in any case risk tapping into a communication with
someone outside the state. Prosecution would be doubtful, however.
"Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921) (employer broke into
desk and safe and seized papers for purpose of prosecution) ; Bacon v. United States,
97 Fed. 35 (C. C. A. 8th 1899); Imboden v. People, 40 Colo. 142, 180, 90 Pac. 608,
619 (1907) ; Gindrat v. People, 138 Ill. 103, 27 N. E. 1085 (1891) (private detective) ;
Commonwealth v. Everson, 123 Ky. 330, 96 S. W. 460 (1906) (landlady); State v.
Mathers, 64 Vt. 101, 23 At. 590 (1892) (letter taken from pocket by daughter);
Barrett v. Fish, 72 Vt. 18, 47 At. 174 (1899) (letters between petitioner and co-adulterer
given to agent to be burned; agent, in breach of faith, gave letters to prosecutor) ; Ware
v. State, 201 Wis. 425, 230 N. W. 80 (1930) (husband stole wife's diary, used in prosecution for adultery). The statutory provision against wire-tapping, however, applies
to all persons, 47 U. S. C. A. § 605 (Supp. 1938).
"Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243 (U. S. 1833). The "due process" and "privileges
and immunities" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment do not incorporate all of these
rights, as restrictions on the states. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1875) (trial by
jury) ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908) (self-incrimination).
"'Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914) (admitting evidence
furnished by local officers). Cf. Pederson v. United States, 271 Fed. 187 (C. C. A. 2d
1921) (evidence seized by British officers).
"Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 47 Sup. Ct. 248 (1927) (search by local police
who invited federal officer to join them; held that mere participation in a state search
by a federal officer is not enough, unless he participates in his official capacity; but the
courts will scrutinize such arrangements for indirect violations, and one was found here) ;
Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310, 48 Sup. Ct. 137 (1927) (state officers, not
directed by federal authority but still enforcing the Federal Prohibition Law, of which
there was no state counterpart; held to be a violation, since done solely on behalf of
Federal Government, if it ratifies it by prosecuting) ; Flagg v. United States, 233 Fed.

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
officers violate state constitutions by anything they may do. 72
B.

Admissibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence

When property is obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure, as here
defined, may the evidence be used in court? The earliest known case is
Bishop Atterbury's Trial,73 in the House of Lords in 1723. Certain letters
were taken from the defendant's person by violence, 74 while others were
intercepted in the mails. 75 These letters were admitted without permitting
inquiry as to the authority by which they were seized.
In America, the question was first raised by a dictum of the Massachusetts
court in Comamonwealth v. Dana,76 in 1841. The court had held the seizure
lawful, but it went on to say, "There is another conclusive answer," that even
if it were illegally seized, the evidence was nevertheless admissible. 77 This
half-page dictum became the basis of a rule that was, at one time or another,
adopted by most of the states. 78 It was never questioned until the United
States Supreme Court countered with an even more gratuitous dictum,79 in
Boyd v. United States,80 in 1886.
The Boyd case, taking what was decided and not what was said, was
probably correctly determined. 8 ' Under court order, defendant produced
certain papers. The Court held that the order violated the Fifth Amendment
by compelling defendant to be a witness against himself, and that the evidence
could not be used. But the Court went on and assimilated such compulsory
481 (C. C. A. 2d 1916) (local officers seized books and papers, taken at once to federal
prosecutor; court indulged presumption that prosecutor had read the Weeks case not
wisely but too well) ; United States v. Welch, 247 Fed. 239 (S. D. N. Y. 1917), aff'd,
267 Fed. 819 (C. C. A. 2d 1920), cert. den., 254 U. S. 637, 41 Sup. Ct. 9 (1920) (steamship detective acting for customs officer in his temporary absence).
Where local officers are actually engaged in enforcing a state statute, and are not
co~perating with federal authorities, there is no violation of the Federal Constitution
and federal courts will admit the evidence. Gowling v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 796
(C. C. A. 6th 1933).
'State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574 (1926) (seizure by federal officers
without knowledge of state authorities; it was for a crime under both laws, so prosecuted in state court-the dual system comes in handy!)
"16 Howell State Trials 323 (1723). The authority of this case is weakened by the
fact that it was a bill of attainder, this procedure being adopted expressly to avoid another
rule of evidence (requiring two witnesses for treason), so it should not be accepted too
readily
as establishing any rule of evidence. See pages 489 and 660 of the report.
4
Id. at 490-493.
"'Id. at 430, 433, 495-96, 629-30.
'2 Metc. 329, 337 (Mass. 1841).
'Citing two English civil cases where court records, obtained without a proper order,
were admitted in evidence. Jordan v. Lewis, 14 East 305 note, 104 Eng. Rep. 618
(1740) ; Legatt v. Tollervey, 14 East 302, 104 Eng. Rep. 617 (1811).
'The first square holding is in State v. Flynn, 36 N. H. 64 (1858).
"It has been said, with some force, that two-thirds of our law stems originally
from dicta.
'116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886). There was an earlier dictum, more directly in
point, in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727, 733 (1877).
'The contrary has been suggested by Edgerton, The Incidence of Judical Control Over
Congress (1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 299, 302.
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production of papers to a search and seizure, both of which force evidence
from a person. Seizure of evidence was thus declared to be equivalent to
compelling a man to be a witness against himself. Two justices, concurring
in result, were unable to stomach this line of reasoning, but they were snowed
under.
The Boyd case caused some stir in the state courts, but most of them recognized it as dictum, and distinguished it in search cases.8 2 The Supreme
Court itself was not fully prepared to follow its rule, for in Adams v. New
York,8 3 in 1904, it indicated that the self-incrimination provision had no
application to search and seizure, and that violations of the latter guaranty
would not be punished indirectly by excluding the evidence, drawing an analogy to the Ker and Mahon cases.84 While later cases sought to distinguish
it on several grounds, 5 the case contains strong language. It distinguishes
the Boyd case, cites and quotes from every leading case for admissibility,
and declares unequivocally for that rule.8 6 A few courts, however, even
after the Adamis case, found the Boyd dictum "too good to be untrue",8T
and declared for the first time that if evidence was obtained in violation of
the constitution, it could not be used in court.88
It took a more definite pronouncement by the highest court than it had
made in the Boyd case, to really fertilize the "seeds of a dangerous heresy"
that the Boyd case had sown. And in 1914 came Weeks v. UNited States,89
in answer to the defense lawyers' prayer. The Court suddenly discovered that
it had admitted the evidence in the Adams case, not for the reasons indicated
in the opinion, but because no motion for the return of the property and
'See Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538, 36 S. W. 940 (1896) ; People v. LeDoux, 155
Cal. 535, 102 Pac. 517 (1909) ; State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo.489, 32 S. W. 1002 (1895);
State v. Atkinson, 40 S.C. 363, 18 S.E. 1021 (1894) ; and many others.
"192 U. S.585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372 (1904), affg' People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E.
636 (1903).
"Supra notes 15 and 28.
"That the seizure was (apparently) lawful, that no preliminary motion was made,
and that it was a seizure by state officers (siupra note 70). Only the first of these is even
suggested in the opinion as a possible second ground of decision.
'If this was dictum, at least the same cannot be said of the short but clear holding
in Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347, 380, 32 Sup. Ct. 793, 807 (1912), where
evidence that certain letters used in evidence were obtained by officers "robbing the
mails" was excluded as irrelevant. "We cannot see how proof of 'a greater crime .. .
in robbing the mails' was relevant to a decision of the charge then under consideration."
"Hammock v. State, 1 Ga. App. 126, 128, 58 S. E. 66, 67 (1907).
"Hammock v. State, 1 Ga. App. 126, 58 S. E. 66 (1907) (distinguishing Williams v.
State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S.E. 624 [1897], which had also come after the Boyd case but
had admitted the evidence, on the basis that a search of the person compels him to be a
witness against himself, while a search of his premises does not i); State v. Sheridan,
121 Iowa 164, 96 N. W. 730 (1903) ; State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atl. 1097 (1901)
(but the court refused to extend the rule to contraband: State v. Krinski, 78 Vt. 162,
62 Atl. 37 [1905]). It is noteworthy that not one of these three states now follows
the federal rule. The Hammock case was repudiated in Calhoun v. State, 144 Ga. 679,
87 S.E. 893 (1916) ; the Sheridan case in State v. Tonn, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N. W. 530
(1923) ; the Slamon case in State v. Stacy, 104 Vt. 379, 401, 160 Atl. 257, 266 (1932).
"232 U. S.383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914).
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the suppression of the evidence had been made before trial. Early cases
and text-writers had made an unfortunate choice of language when they
said that the court would not "stop the trial" to try a "collateral" issue. A
collateral issue, properly, is one that has no bearing on the merits of the case,
in short, one that is irrelevant. It is no less collateral when it is raised
in advance of trial than when it is raised at any other time. But when the
Court at last decided to read into the Constitution the requirement that the
evidence be excluded, it seized on these words as the basis for distinguishing
past holdings, and read into it also a rule of practice found in no constitution,
in no statute, 90 and in no analogous rule of evidence! As to all other rules
of evidence, courts universally stop the trial, exclude the jury if necessary,
and determine the admissibility of the evidence-the confession of a prisoner,
the qualifications of an expert or of a child witness, and a myriad others. If
the court in the Adam-s case had really thought the evidence improper, it
would have determined the facts on the trial and excluded the evidence. But
Justice Day, who delivered the opinions in both cases, insisted that the lack
of a preliminary motion was a distinguishing fact.
Then the parade began. The fervent rhetoric in the Weeks case influenced
one court after another to follow the new rule, just as fast as defense lawyers
discovered the magic formula whereby older cases might be distinguished.
No matter how strong and how sweeping the language in the older cases,
no matter how little they rested on an unwillingness to "stop the trial",
courts found that this was the true basis of the older cases, and distinguished
them.9 ' A rare few definitely overruled their former holdings, 92 and others
"Since 1917, there has been statutory sanction for this procedure. 40 STAT. 229,
18 U. S. C. A. § 626. But there was none at the time. It appears first to have been
attempted in United States v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1908), where
the practice was approved but the motion was denied on the ground that the evidence
was admissible -(following the Adams case). It was first successful in United States v.
Mills, 185 Fed. 318 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1911), app. dismissed sub nom. Wise v. Mills,
220 U. S. 549, 31 Sup. Ct. 597 (1911), which followed the Boyd case, obscurely distinguishing the Adams case.
"The lack of a motion was given as the ground of distinguishing in People v. Marxhausen, 204 Mich. 559, 171 N. W. 557 (1919) (distinguishing People v. Aldorfer, 164
Mich. 676, 130 N. W. 351 [1911]) ; State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S. W. 100 (1924)
(distinguishing State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489. 32 S. W. 1002 [1895]); State ex rel.
Thibodeau v. District Court, 70 Mont. 202, 224 Pac. 866 (1924) (distinguishing State
v. Reed, 53 Mont. 292, 163 Pac. 477 [1917]); State v. McDaniel, 115 Ore. 187, 231
Pac. 965 (1925) (distinguishing State v. Ware, 79 Ore. 367, 154 Pac. 905, 155 Pac.
364 [1916]) ; State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390 (1922) (ignoring State v.
Royce, 38 Wash. 111, 80 Pac. 268 [1905], but the cases are distinguishable on this
ground). Other grounds for distinguishing cases were found in People v. Brocamp, 307
Ill. 448, 138 N. E. 728 (1923) (distinguishing a one-time leading case, Gindrat v.
People, 138 Ill. 103, 27 N. E. 1085 [1891], and other cases, on the ground that the
seizure was by a private detective) ; and in Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S. W.
588 (1922) (distinguishing Cohn v. State, 120 Tenn. 61, 109 S. W. 451 [1907] on
the ground that there was no technical search when officers made a peep-hole in
defendant's wall).
'State v. Arregui, 44 Ida. 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927) (overruling State v. Anderson,
31 Ida. 514, 174 Pac. 124 [1918], which was indistinguishable because a motion was
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simply overlooked them. 93- At present, by decision or by statute, the federal
94
These
rule is adopted in twenty-one states, in complete or modified form.
states are concentrated in two principal areas, a solid belt from north to
south throughout the Middle West (excluding only Alabama), and: the norththere made and denied) ; Nicholas v. City of Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 474, 182 N. E. 26
(1932) (the latest convert, repudiating strong dicta in Rosanski v. State, 106 Ohio
St. 442, 140 N. E. 370 [1922]) ; Gore v. State. 24 Okla. Cr. 394, 218 Pac. 545 (1923)
(overruling Silva v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 97, 116 Pac. 199 1[1911]) ; State v. Gooder,
57 S. D. 619, 234 N. W. 610 (1931) (overruling City of Sioux Falls v. Walser, 45 S. D.
417, 187 N. W. 821 [1922]) ; State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261 (1922)
(rejecting strong dicta in State v. Edwards, 51 W. Va. 220, 41 S. E. 429 [1902] and
State v. Sutter, 71 W. Va. 371, 76 S. E. 811 [1912]; completely ignoring the only
square case, State v. Douglas, 20 W. Va. 770 [1882]).
.'Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845 (1922) (ignoring Pringle v. State, 108
Miss. 802, 67 So. 455 [1915]) ; Town of Blacksburg v. Beam, 104 S. C. 146, 88 S. E.
441 (1916) (citing no cases at all, overlooking State v. Atkinson, 40 S. C. 363, 18 S. E.
1021 [1894]; the Blacksburg case was in turn overruled and admissibility restored
in State v. Prescott, 125 S. C. 22, 117 S. E. 637 [1923]).
'United States v. Giovanetti, 6 Alaska 454 (1921); Gildrie v. State, 94 Fla. 134,
113 So. 704 (1927); State v. Arregui, 44 Ida. 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927); People v.
Castree, 311 Ili. 392, 143 N. E. 112 (1924); People v. Lind, 18 N. E. (2d) 189
(Ill. 1938) ; Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 136 N. E. 10, 138 N. E. 817 (1922);
Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920) ; People v. Marxhausen,
204 Mich. 559, 171 N. W. 557 (1919); Tucker v. State, 128 Miss. 211, 90 So. 845
(1922) ; State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 259 S. W. 100 (1924) ; State ex rel. Thibodeau v.
District Court, 70 Mont. 202, 224 Pac. 866 (1924); Nicholas v. City of Cleveland, 125
Ohio St. 474, 182 N. E. 26 (1932); Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Cr. 394, 218 Pac. 545
(1923) ; State v. McDaniel, 115 Ore. 187, 231 Pac. 965 (1925) ; State v. Gooder, 57 S. D.
619, 234 N. W. 610 (1931); Hughes v. State, 145 Tenn. 544, 238 S. W. 588 (1922);
Odenthal v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. 1, 290 S. W. 743 (1927) (under statute, CODE CnIM.
PRoc. [Vernon 1925] § 727a, changing the rule announced in Welchek v. State, 93
Tex. Cr. 271, 247 S. W. 524 [1922]); State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 203 Pac. 390
(1922) ; State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261 (1922) ; Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis.
407, 193 N. W. 89 (1923) ; State v. Peterson, 27 Wyo. 185, 194 Pac. 342 (1920).
In North Carolina, an attempt was made to adopt the federal rule by statute in
1937 (N. C. CODE ANN. ,[Michie Supp. 1937] § 4530 [1]), but poor drafting immediately
led to the anomalous result that evidence obtained under an illegal warrant is inadmissible,
but evidence obtained without a warrant is still admitted. State v. McGee, 198 S. E.
616 (N. C. 1938).
In Maryland and Michigan, compromises have been adopted in the interest of public
safety. In Maryland, where the evidence formerly was admissible. (Lawrence v.
State, 103 Md. 17, 63 Atl. 96 [1906]), the Legislature was unwilling to go the whole
route, and declared in 1929 that such evidence should be inadmissible in misdemeanor
trials but admissible in felony cases. MD. AN. CODE (Flack Supp. 1935) Art. 35,
§ 4A. Michigan had followed the rule of inadmissibility, which, resting on supposed
constitutional grounds, could not *be changed by statute. But crime conditions got
sufficiently serious (see the study by Waite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons
[1933] 31 Micn. L. REv. 749) that the Legislature proposed a constitutional amendment excepting dangerous weapons from this rule, if seized "outside the curtilage of
any dwelling house". It was accepted by the voters in 1936, and will be found in
Mich. Pub. Acts. 1937, p. 876.
Two attempts to write the federal rule into state constitutions have been defeated.
A convention in Louisiana in 1921 rejected the rule (see State v. Fleckinger, 152 La.
337, 341, 93 So. 115, 116 ([1922]), and the New York convention in .1938 did likewise
after a long and bitter debate. A compromise similar to the Michigan amendment was
proposed by Delegate Poletti (now Lieutenant Governor), but was also rejected.
CONVENTIox RacoPD (N. Y. 1938) p. 617. The fight is now going on in the Legislature,
and before this article appears, New York will probably be completely or partially
in the federal camp, because a compromise has already been proposed by the admissibility
adherents, which would reject evidence obtained by illegal wire-tapping, but not other
illegally obtained evidence. N. Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1939, p. 1, col. 1.
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west corner of the country. Outside of these two areas, there are only three
concurring states in the Southwest and three on the South Atlantic seaboard (two of the latter having statutes in restricted form). The rule of
admissibility is followed in the remaining twenty-seven states (three of them
by dictum), 5 and in three of the federal rule states the evidence is admissible in certain cases. 96 The evidence is admitted in England9 7 and Canada,98
on common law principles.
"In some of these states, the question of whether the evidence will be excluded on
preliminary motion has never been raised, and the cases are still subject to be distinguished on this ground. But the courts in most of these states have reviewed their
prior decisions with the federal rule before them and have not rested their decisions
on so narrow a ground. The cases in which a motion has been made and denied
are starred; in these states the question appears closed. Where possible, a leading
early case has been supported by a later case reviewing the question after the Weeks
decision. The cases admitting illegally seized evidence are: Shields v. State, 104 Ala.
35, 16 So. 85 (1893) ; Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293 (1921), cert. den., 260
U. S. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. 96 (1922) ; Argetakis v. State, 24 Ariz. 599, 212 Pac. 372 (1923)
(dictum) ; Starchman v. State, 62 Ark. 538, 36 S. W. 940 (1896); Venable v. State,
156 Ark. 564, 246 S. W. 860 (1923); People v. LeDoux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 Pac. 517
(1909) ; People v. Mayen*, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922) ; Massantonio v. People*,
77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019 (1925),; State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 Atl. 636
(1924) (dictum, but thorough discussion) ; State v. Chuchola*, 32 Del. 133, 120 Atl. 212
(Ct. Gen. Sess. 1922); Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624 (1897); Herndon
v. State, 178 Ga. 832, 174 S. E. 597 (1934) ; Territory v. Soga, 20 Hawaii 71 (1910) ;
State v. Tonn*, 195 Iowa 94, 191 N. W. 530 (1923) ; State v. Miller, 63 Kan. 62, 64
Pac. 1033 (1901); State v. Johnson*, 116 Kan. 58, 226 Pac. 245 (1924); State v.
Fleckinger*, 152 La. 337, 93 So. 115 (1922) ; State v. Burroughs, 72 Me. 479 (1881) ;
Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 157 Mass. 519, 32 N. E. 910 (1893); Commonwealth v.
Wilkins*, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N. E. 11 (1923) ; State v. Hesse, 154 Minn. 89, 191 N. W.
267 (1922); Georgis v. State*, 110 Neb. 352, 193 N. W. 713 (1923); State v. Chin
Gim*, 47 Nev. 431, 224 Pac. 798 (1924) ; State v. Flynn, 36 N. H. 64 (1858) ; State v.
Agalos, 79 N. H. 241, 107 Atl. 314 (1919) (dictum); State v. Lyons, 99 N. J. L.
301, 122 Atl. 758 (1923) ; State v. First Criminal Judicial District*, 10 N. J. Misc.
715, 160 Atl. 672 (Sup. Ct. 1932); State v. Dillon*, 34 N. M. 366, 281 Pac. 474, 88
A. L. R. 340 (1929) ; People v. Adams, 176 N. Y. 351, 68 N. E. 636 (1903), aff'd sub
nonz. Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372 (1904) ; People v. Defore*,
242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926), cert. den., 270 U. S. 657, 46 Sup. Ct. 353 (1926) ;
State v. Fahn*, 53 N. D. 203, 205 N. W. 67 (1925) ; Commonwealth v. Dabbierio*, 290
Pa. 174, 138 Atl. 679 (1927) (this report does not say whether there was a pre-trial
motion, but the report below in 89 Pa. Super. Ct. 435 1[1926] reveals that a motion was
duly made and denied) ; State v. Chester, 46 R. I. 485, 129 Atl. 596 (1925) (dictum) ;
State v. Atkinson, 40 S. C. 363, 18 S. E. 1021 (1894) ; State v. Prescott, 125 S. C. 22,
117 S. E. 637 (1923); State v. Aime*, 62 Utah 476, 220 Pac. 704 (1923); State v.
Krinski, 78 Vt. 162, 62 Atl. 37 (1905) ; State v. Stacy, 104 Vt. 379, 160 Ati. 257
(1932); Lucchesi v. Commonwealth*, 122 Va. 872, 94 S. E. 925 (1918) (dictum);
Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727, 121 S. E. 154 (1924).
This rule is ably defended by Prof. Wigmore in 4 EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2183, 2184.
Whereas the legislature is empowered to abandon or modify this rule by statute, it
is impossible to adopt this rule by statute when the courts have followed the federal
rule. It was attempted in Mississippi (L. 1924, c. 244, § 3, relating only to Prohibition
Orick v. State, 140 Miss. 184,
cases), but the statute was declared unconstitutional.
1055 So. 465 (1925).
" Maryland, Michigan, North Carolina. Supra note 94.
"Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 323 (H. L. 1723) ; Regina v. Granatelli,
7 St. Tr. (x. s.) 979, 987 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1849). No later cases have been found, but
it is stated to be the law of England as recently as (1922) 86 JusT. P. 173.
"Rex v. Moore, 17 Alta. 503, 63 Dom. L. R. 472 (App. Div. 1922); Regina v. Doyle,
12 Ont. Rep. 347 (1886); Rex v. Honan, 26 Ont. L. R. 484, 6 Dom. L. R. 276 (C. A.
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The fact that the federal rule grew up by a process of distinguishing former
cases has saddled the rule with a court-made rule of practice that it has not
yet shaken off. If, as these courts maintain, the Constitution forbids the use
of evidence obtained in violation of its provisions, it surely should have been
treated like other rules of evidence with a less sanctified origin, with objection
permitted on the trial, and there is no constitutional authority permitting
a court to impose restrictions not clearly implied in the implied provision of
the Constitution. 9 A few courts, lacking or sweeping aside contrary precedents, recognized this argument and declared that this rule shall be treated
like any other rule of evidence, with objection to be raised on trial.' 00 So
far as there is any justification for the rule of exclusion, this seems the
preferable view.1 1
But other courts, loath to dispense with earlier precedents, have retained
the above requirement and will admit the evidence if no preliminary motion
is made.' 0 2 It has been assumed by many courts and writers that the
1912); Rex. v. Hawkins, 35 Que. K. B. 96 (1923); Rex v. Gilchrist, [1936] 3 Dom.
L. R. 238 (Sask. K. B.).
By a curious inversion of the federal rule, the Canadian courts will admit the evidence
but deny a forfeiture. Rex v. Moore, supra; Ex Parte Kavanaugh, 2 Can. C. C. 267
(N. B. 1896). Cf. Dodge v. United States, 272 U. S. 530, 47 Sup. Ct. 191 (1926), and
see supra note 24.
"It is surely heaping fiction on fiction to read in both the bar of the evidence and

the unusual procedural restriction on this implied bar!
"'Kentucky: No motion required. Youman v. Commonwealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W.
860 (1920).

A motion before trial is properly overruled, for the issue can only be

raised on the trial. Commonwealth v. Meiner, 196 Ky. 840, 245 S. W. 890 (1922). A
motion to strike out, at the close of all the evidence, is timely although no objection
had been made. Wathen v. Commonwealth, 211 Ky. 586, 277 S. W. 839 (1925).
Maryland: No motion required, under statute. Gormafi v. State, 161 Md. 700,
158 Atl. 903 (1932).
Mississippi: Irrespective of motion, no seized evidence can be admitted on the trial
without showing a warrant or justifying the lack of one. King v. State, 147 Miss. 31,

113 So. 173 (1927). But objection must be made to the offer 'of the evidence, not
after it has come in. McNutt v. State, 143 Miss. 347, 108 So. 721 (1926).
North Carolina: No motion specified in statute. N. C. CoDE ANN. (Michie Supp.
1937) § 4530(1).

Oklahoma: No motion required. Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Cr. 394, 218 Pac. 545 (1923).
But defendant must "object at the first opportunity". Webb v. State, 33 Okla. Cr. 77,
242 Pac. 784 (1926) (failed to object to offer of evidence; this language does not
impose the requirement of a motion). A motion is sanctioned, however. Committi
v. State, 28 Okla. Cr. 380, 231 Pac. 316 (1924).
Tennessee: No motion required. State v. Bass, 153 Tenn. 162, 281 S. W. 936 (1926).
Texas: Under statute, no motion required. Odenthal v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. 1, 290
S. W. 743 (1927). Nor is it permitted. Gentry v. State, 105 Tex. Cr. 385, 288 S. W.
213 (1926).
West Virginia: No motion required. State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261
(1922).
"One sound reason for the requirement, however-though it would apply equally
to many rules of pleading and evidence in which it is not applied,-is that it prevents
surprise of the prosecutor, who may not know of the illegality of the seizure. Atkinson,
Prohibition and the Weeks case (1925) 23 MicH. L. REv. 748, 751.
'State v. Wansgaard, 46 Ida. 20, 265 Pac. 671 (1928) (motion after jury impaneled
is too late; cf. State v. Arregui, 44 Ida. 43, 254 Pac. 788 [1927], motion after plea
but before jury impaneled held timely) ; People v. Winn, 324 Ill. 428, 155 N. E. 337
(1927); McSwain v. State, 89 Ind. App. 592, 166 N. E. 444, 167 N. E. 568 (1929)
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federal courts had abandoned the requirement, 10 3 because of the language used
10 4
in and the results of a series of leading cases that followed the Weeks case.
But later federal cases, following a significant dictum in Segurola v. United
States,10 5 have held that the requirement of a motion is still maintained,'
although subject to undefined "exceptions". 10 6 Analyzing the cases in which
it has been held unnecessary, it is difficult to be sure whether the rule rests
1° 7
on waiver or on trial convenience. In Gouled v. United States, defendant had
no knowledge before the trial that the particular evidence had been illegally

seized. In Amos v. United States'0 8 and Agnello v. United States,109 the fact of
illegal seizure was not in controversy but was brought out on cross-examination
of the witness who offered the evidence. It is probable that in the courts which
recognize the latter exception, there is no question of waiver by failure
(but cf. an earlier case in a higher court, where no mention is made of a motion having
been made yet the evidence was excluded. Callender v. State, 193 Ind. 91, 136 N. E.
10, 138 N. E. 817 [1922]); People v. Vulje, 223 Mich. 656, 194 N. W. 582 (1923)
(motion after impaneling of jury had begun, too late); People v. Boyd, 228 Mich.
57, 199 N. W. 662 (1924) (notice of motion served two days before trial date;
rules required four days notice, and the evidence was given before the motion could be
heard; admissible) (but cf. People v. Van Vorce, 240 Mich. 75, 215 N. W. 5 [1927],
in which the notice was served before trial but the case was pushed to trial too
soon; held, the court's refusal to grant a continuance or shorten the time of notice
was an abuse of discretion); State v. Wagner, 311 Mo. 391, 279 S. W. 23 (1926);
State v. Gotta, 71 Mont. 288,' 229 Pac. 405 (1924) ; Ciano v. State, 105 Ohio St. 229,
137 N. E. 10 (1922) (this case preceded the express adoption of the rule in Ohio,
but it contains dicta indicating that the court already inclined that way); State v.
Harris, 119 Ore. 422, 249 Pac. 1046 (1926); United States v. Cerecedo, 6 Porto
Rico Fed. 607 (1914); State v. Dersiy, 121 Wash. 455, 209 Pac. 837 (1922) (motion
immediately after calling of case for trial, before jury impaneled, too late).
The making of an unsuccessful motion before trial does not relieve of the need to
object at the trial. Robertson v. State, 94 Fla. 770, 114 So. 534 (1927). Contra:
Giles v. United States, 284 Fed. 208 (C. C. A. 1st 1922) (but cf. Segurola v. United
States, 275 U. S. 106, 48 Sup. Ct. 77 [1927]).
"'1The lower federal courts were in confusion on this question. Motion required:
Youngblood v. United States, 266 Fed. 795 (C. C. A. 8th 1920); Wiggins v. United
States, 272 Fed. 41 (C. C. A. 2d 1921); Armstrong v. United States, 16 F. (2d)
62 (C. C. A. 9th 1926), cert. den., 273 U. S. 766, 47 Sup. Ct. 571 (1927). No motion
required: Ganci v. United States, 287 Fed. 60 (C. C. A. 2d 1923) (even though
no objection to evidence, motion to strike tfmely at any time before verdict) ; Rizzo v.
United States, 275 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 4th 1921) (no objection or motion to strike;
held properly raised by motion for directed verdict).
"'Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921); Amos v. United
States, 255 U. S. 313, 41 Sup. Ct. 266 (1921) ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20,
46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925). In none of these cases was a preliminary motion made, and in
the Gouled case, at p. 313, the Court said, "A rule of practice must not be allowed for
any technical reason to prevail over a constitutional right."
' 275 U. S. 106, 112, 48 Sup. Ct. 77, 79-80 (1927). In this case, there was no
objection on the trial, so it is not too strong an authority for the necessity of raising
it before trial, but there is a dictum to that effect, citing the Adams case, supra note 83.
The dictum is quoted in Cogen v. United States, 278 U. S. 221, 223, 49 Sup. Ct. 118
(1929).
10ORocchia v. United States, 78 F. (2d) 966 (C. C. A. 9th 1935); Peters v. United
97 F. (2d) 500 (C. C. A. 9th 1938).
States,
-3Supra note 104. In People v. Bass, 235 Mich. 588, 209 N. W. 926 (1926), where
defendant knew of the seizure but his attorney did not, the court denied objection on
the trial, saying it was defendant's duty to tell his attorney.
-Supra note 104.
Supra note 104.
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to move, but if that is the case, the defendant's rights are made to hang on
the district attorney's decision to make an issue of it; if the officer denies the
key facts (for example, probable cause for obtaining the warrant), the court
will not determine the issue. It becomes, then, purely a question of trial
convenience, which will be waived when there was no opportunity to raise
the issue before trial and will be inapplicable where the facts are undisputed
or where the illegality appears upon the face of the warrant or affidavits
so that a pure question of law is presented.1"
The motion which is customarily made is not merely for the return of the
evidence but also for the suppression of all oral evidence of what the
officers saw in the course of the unlawful search. L ' Furthermore, the officers
can make no use whatever of the knowledge gained by the illegal search.
'In Silverthorne Lumber Compay v. United States, 2 officers seized the
books of a corporation. They were returned on motion. Thereupon, since
corporations cannot assert the privilege against self-incrimination,11 3 the books
were subpoenaed. The case came up on contempt for disobeying the subpoena,
and it was held that the government could not use its tainted knowledge
even to found a regular and legal proceeding. Presumably, therefore, a new
search warrant likewise could not be founded upon "probable cause" derived
from such knowledge. In the Gouled case,114 a contention was made but not
expressly passed on (the Court deciding generally for the defendant) that
certain duplicate originals of a seized contract, lawfully obtained from the
other party to the contract, should be suppressed on the ground that its
existence was inferred as a result of discovering the original unlawfully.
Nevertheless, the information does not become sacred and inaccessible, but
the officers must put the search out of mind and hustle around for inde"The rules are thus stated in Robertson v. State, 94 Fla. 770, 114 So. 534 (1927) ;
State v. Dersiy, on rehearing, 121 Wash. 455, 461, 215 Pac. 34 (1923); State v.
Warfield, 184 Wis. 56, 198 N. W. 854 (1924) (applying the second rule).
In any event, it is discretionary with the trial court, if a motion is made, to withhold consideration until the facts are developed on the trial. Panzich v. United States,
285 Fed. 871 (C. C. A. 9th 1922).
"'United States v. Kraus, 270 Fed. 578 (S. D. N. Y. 1921); Flagg v. United
States, 233 Fed. 481 (C. C. A. 2d 1916); Carignano v. State, 31 Okla. Cr. 228, 238
Where
(no motion there required, but excluded oral evidence).
Pac. 507 (1925)
the property is possessed by revenue officers, not officers of the court and not acting
pursuant to judicial process, they cannot be bound by a motion to return, but an
independent proceeding must be brought to regain the property; but a motion to suppress
the evidence would be proper. United States v. Hee, 219 Fed. 1019 (D. N. J. 1915).
Where the property seized is contraband, its possession being unlawful, it is subject to forfeiture (see supra note 24), so a motion to suppress or destroy the evidence would be made. See infra note 137. And see full discussion in United States
v. Goodhues, 53 F. (2d) 696 (D. Md. 1931).
"251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 (1920).
"'Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 74, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 378 (1906); Essgee Co. of
v. United States, 262 U. S. 151, 43 Sup. Ct. 514 (1923).
China
11
Supra note 104.
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pendent sources of the same information, in no way traceable to their prior
misdeeds." 65
The rule of exclusion, as manifested in the federal and state courts, is
honeycombed with exceptions, some resulting from the limitations of the
constitutional guaranty, as heretofore outlined, and some from an attempt to
distinguish prior cases (admitting the evidence) by confining them to their
facts. The most important exceptions result from the fact that the rule
itself is regarded as an exception to the general rule that illegality in obtaining
evidence does not operate to exclude it unless some constitutional right
has been violated. 116 Hence it is universally agreed 117 that evidence is
not to be excluded because obtained by the wrong of a private individual. 1 8
It is also agreed that evidence wrongfully obtained by officers of a different
government than that conducting the prosecution might be admitted without
violating the constitution,"19 provided there was no collusion between such
officers and those of the prosecuting government ;120 but, irrespective of the
constitutional question, a number of courts and one legislature have doubted
the propriety of accepting such evidence from other officers as a matter of
public policy.' 2 ' This exception has been subjected to a great deal of
criticism, particularly by judges holding the contrary view who utilize
the familiar device of reductio ad absurdum.12 2 The exception has probably
'The procedure on a motion in such a case was outlined by Judge Learned Hand
in United States v. Kraus, 270 Fed. 578 (S. D. N. Y. 1921): the order of the court
provides that all information contained in the seized papers, shall be suppressed, unless
the officers can show that they learned it independently of their wrongful possession
of the papers; this issue is settled by reference to a master, to whom proof of

independent information is presented.
For an example of evidence subsequently obtained as a result of knowledge from
sources independent of the prior seizure, see Safarik v. United States, 62 F. (2d)
892 (C. C. A. 8th 1933).
"'Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure (1920) 13 MINN.
L. REv. 1, 13, submits that all illegally obtained evidence should now be excluded, since
what he considers the sole reason for the common law rule, the desire to avoid collateral
issues on the trial, has been eliminated by the invention of. the motion. But it is the
thesis of this article that there are more important reasons than this for the rule of
admissibility and that few if any of the leading cases that established that rule
ever went off on this ground. It became merely a convenient peg on which to hang a
new rule when a court changed its mind.
But, irrespective of reasons, Fraenkel is not without support in high places. See
dissent of Justices Brandeis and Holmes in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 476,
41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921) (private individual seized papers).
11Brandeis and Holmes dissenting. See supra note 116.
"Cases cited supra note 68.
mSupra notes 70 and 72.
"'Supranote 71.
mEvidence of federal officers rejected in state courts: State v. Arregui, 44 Ida. 43,
254 Pac. 788 (1927); Wathen v. Commonwealth, 211 Ky. 586, 277 S. W. 839 (1925)
(without discussion of the point) ; Ramirez v. State, 123 Tex. Cr. 254, 58 S. W. (2d)
829 (1933) (under statute expressly excluding evidence obtained by an officer or other
person in violation of the constitution or laws of Texas or the Federal Constitution,
a provision which would seem broad enough to exclude the results even of private
trespasses, although no case in point has been found. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. [Vernon
1925] § 727a). Contra: State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574 (1926).
=In People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 22, 150 N. E. 585, 588 (1926), Judge Cardozo
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been overemphasized, for the courts have been astute to discover collusion.
There is another exception of major importance, although it has never
come squarely before the Supreme Court. It is uniformly held that a
defendant cannot object to the seizure of another's property, for no constitutional right of the defenidant has been violated. 123 The immunity from
search and seizure is a personal one. The third party whose property was
seized may move for its return,124 but he may not have oral evidence concerning it suppressed except as against himself.12 5 A proprietary or possessory interest in either the premises searched or the things seized would
appear to be sufficient, 12 6 although there are cases in the circuit courts of
appeals that suggest that if the defendant's own property is searched but
articles belonging to another are seized, the defendant can make no complaint.
These cases seem of doubtful validity, however, for his constitutional rights
were violated by the search of his property, and whatever was found was a
direct result of this violation.' 27 The owner of property leased to another
attacks the federal rule as "either too strict or too lax", for the prosecutor who, in
using the results of his own officers' wrongs, is said to ratify the means, need not be
so scrupulous about evidence brought to him by others. "We exalt form above substance when we hold that the use is made lawful because the intruder is without a
badge of office."
In State v. Fahn, 53 N. D. 203, 210, 205 N. W. 67, 70 (1925), it is said that the
result of the federal rule is that if one enters a house with felonious intent, the evidence
of what he saw and took away is admitted; but if he enter as an officer, his eyes, ears,
and lips are sealed.
The vitriolic dissenter in State v. Gooder, 57 S. D. 619, 633, 234 N. W. 610, 616
(1930), regards it as a "mystic and incomprehensible honor that accepts and shares
the dishonorable conduct of faithless and disobedient officers of the particular jurisdiction in which the case is to be tried, but which honor refuses to be sullied by the
unlawful acts of citizens or officers of another jurisdiction."
'LTsuie Shee v. Backus, 243 Fed. 551 (C. C. A. 9th 1917) ; Connolly v. Medalie, 58
F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A. 2d 1932), citing cases from every circuit except the first.
"'United States v. Spallino, 21 F. (2d) 567 (W. D. N. Y. 1927).
'If; re Dooley, 48 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 2d 1931). The court leaves open the question whether the evidence might, after return, be subpoenaed for use against the other
defendants; since the process is directed against the one wronged, even though the
evidence is not to be used against him, a subpoena might be denied if based on knowledge
gained by the search. Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, supra note 112.
'Gilliland v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 453, 6 S. W. (2d) 467 (1928).
See Safarik
v. United States, 62 F. (2d) 892, 895 (C. C. A. 8th 1933) (stating that, to raise
the issue, defendant must own, lease, control, occupy, possess, or have an interest
in the property).
Apparently the sender and recipient of telegrams have sufficient interest in the
copies filed with the telegraph company to object to their unlawful seizure. See Hearst
v. Black, 66 App. D. -C. 313, 87 F. (2d) 68 (1936) (the court denied relief on the
special grounds that it could not control the Senate Committee, and that the Communications Commission contemplated no further seizures and had turned over the spoils
to the Senators). But such telegrams are subject to subpoena for a proper purpose,
since such process is not directed against a party and does not compel him to give evidence. Newfield v. Ryan, 91 F. (2d) 700 (C. C. A. 5th 1937), cert. den., 302 U. S. 729,
58 Sup. Ct. 54 (1937) ; State v. Sawtelle, 66 N. H. 488, 32 Atl. 831 (1891) ; cf. McMann
v. Securities and Exchange Comm., 87 F. (2d) 377 (C. C. A. 2d 1937), cert. den., 301
U. S. 684, 57 Sup. Ct. 785 (1937) (defendant's brokerage account may be subpoenaed).
"Hurwitz v. United States, 299 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 8th 1924) (narcotics illegally
seized in defendant's car; since two of the bottles had been previously sold to a third
party, they were admitted in evidence with the admonition to the jury that they
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cannot complain of a search, for he has' no right to possession. 128 A lessee
or other lawful occupant, has a sufficient interest to raise the issue.1 29 But
one having merely the custody of the property as an employee is not protected ;130 the evidence may be used against the workman at the still, but
the head bootlegger must be protected in his constitutional right of privacy.
There is some doubt as to the officers of a corporation. In the Silvertorne
case, 18 ' corporate officers were protected against unlawful seizure and use
of corporate papers, which raises some doubt as to whether the Supreme
Court, if squarely presented with the question, would not repudiate the
whole third party exception. However, the lower courts have regularly
applied the exception, and have refused protection even to officers -of corporations and associations, 13 2 distinguishing the Silverthorne case if it was
raiged at all.' 83 If the defendant disclaims ownership or possession of the
property, he has no standing to demand its return or suppression;134 but
should disregard them unless they found an executed sale had been consummated!);
Lewis v. United States, 92 F. (2d) 952 (C. C. A. 10th 1937) (memorandum book of
prostitute taken from white slaver's baggage, held admissible because not his property) ;
State v. Goldstein, 111 Ore. 221, 224 Pac. 1087 (1924), (stolen goods taken from
defendant's shop, held admissible). Contra: People v. Galnt, 235 Mich. 646, 209 N. W.
915 (1926) (possessor of liquor in his own dwelling may suppress evidence although
he does not own the liquor).
Would it be amiss to suggest that courts shrink from their vaunted "liberal" interpretation of the Bill of Rights when confronted with a drug peddler, a white slaver, or
a thief, instead of a Prohibition or revenue violator?
'Hardwig v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 6th 1928). The fact that
the trespassing officers passed through parts of the premises occupied by defendant
is immaterial if the search and seizure occurred in leased portions. United States v.
Muscarelle, 63 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 2d) (1933).
'Alvau v. United States, 33 F. (2d) 467 (C. C. A. 9th 1929) (one actually domiciled
in residence, as a guest or employee, may claim protection) ; Gilliland v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 453, 6 S. W. (2d) 467 (1928) (lessee). But a trespasser, using an
abandoned farm building as a still and as a residence, is not protected. Stakich v.
United States, 24 F. (2d) 701 (C. C. A. 9th 1928) (as trespassers, their possessio
pedis was protected to the extent of actual occupancy-the building itself-but by the
time the officers got that close they saw the crime in process, and made a lawful arrest
and search).
'Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A. 2d 1932) (watchman and workers
at still) ; Whitcombe v. United States, 90 F. (2d) 290 (C. C. A. 3rd 1937) (driver of
liquor truck and workers).
2"251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 (1920).
'Haywood v. United States, 268 Fed. 795 (C. C. A. 7th 1920), cert. den., 256
U. S. 689, 41 Sup. Ct. 449 (1921) (voluntary association regarded as entity distinct
from its members for all purposes except contract liability, so its officers could not
assert its constitutional immunity 'from search) ; Newingham v. United States, 4 F.
(2d) 490 (C. C. A. 3rd 1925) (officers and sole owners of corporation not protected).
'-The Haywood case, supra note 132, refers to the Silverthorne case and says that
if "proper parties"--presumably the same officers in their capacity as such, instead
of as individuals-had applied, the evidence would have been returned and no subpoena
could have been enforced (unless founded on independent knowledge). In the Dooley
case, supra note 125, the court distinguishes the Silverthorne case by treating corporate
officers as sni generis, sharing the immunity of their corporation on grounds of policy,
for there would be little to discourage the police from illegal raids on corporations
if all they lost was the corporation's fine, its officers still being punishable.
2'Gowling v. United States, 64 F. (2d) 796 (1933); and the same is implicit in
the cases cited supra notes 123 et seq.
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if he alleges ownership or possession in affidavits on the motion, these damaging admissions, having resulted wholly from the exigency of the unlawful
search, are excluded from evidence. 3 5
Somewhat related to this exception is another one once clearly the rule
in a few courts and frequently recognized by dicta during the "growing
pains" of the federal rule, by courts hesitant to accept its full implications.
This rule is that illegally seized evidence is excluded unless it is contraband
or is "the corpus delicti".3 6 Under this rule, evidence unlawfully seized
could be used if it was stolen property, property the possession of which was
unlawful, or forfeitable property, on the same theory that property belonging
to a third party could be used, since forfeiture of contraband property occurs
automatically upon the commission of the forbidden act, the later judicial
declaration of forfeiture relating back to that time, and it was regarded
as a seizure of government property.13 7 But, except in Vermont and some
lower federal courts, no jurisdiction has ever produced two decisions, one
holding contraband admissible and the other holding non-contraband inadmissible, and those jurisdictions, moving in opposite directions, have since
repudiated the distinction. Therefore, while some dicta remain to haunt a
few courts, it may be said that the contraband exception is virtually a dead
'=Safarik v. United States, 62 F. (2d) 892 (C. C. A. 8th 1933). Contra: Vaught v.
United States, 7 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A. 9th 1925) (without discussion).
='United States v. Welch, 247 Fed. 239 (S. D. N. Y. 1917), aff'd, 267 Fed. 819 (C. C.
A. 2d 1920), cert. den., 254 U. S. 637, 41 Sup. Ct. 9(1920) (letter used in aiding the
enemy, held to be the corpus delicti so admissible) ; United States v. Fenton, 268 Fed.
221 (D. Mont. 1920) (liquor and automobile seized; as they were forfeitable, held
to be a seizure of government's property, of which defendant cannot complain);
Pasch v. People, 72 Colo. 92, 209 Pac. 639 (1922) (liquor; court rests it on basis of
contraband, but in a later liquor case the court unequivocally adopted the rule of complete
admissibility. Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019 [1925]); State v.
Chuchola, 32 Del. 133, 120 Atl. 212 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1922) (liquor case, held admissible;
"it may be" that the rule would be different if not contraband, but no case has so held) ;
Matter of Horschler, 116 Misc. 243, 190 N. Y. Supp. 355 (Co. Ct. 1921) (noncontraband held inadmissible, using this basis to distinguish the Adams case) ; State
v. Simmons, 183 N. C. 684, 110 S. E. 591 (1922) (liquor; dictum thus distinguishes
Weeks case); Rosanski v. State, 106 Ohio St. 442, 140 N. E. 370 (1922) (rests on
contraband rule, but vigorous dictum for general admissibility; overruled on both points,
Nicholas v. City of Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 474, 182 N. E. 26 " [1932]); State v.
Chester, 46 R. I. 485, 129 At. 596 (1925) (dictum) ; City of Sioux Falls v. Walser,
45 S. D. 417, 187 N. W. 821 (1922) (liquor admissible; overruled in State v. Gooder,
57 S. D. 619, 234 N. W. 610 1[1931]) ; State v. Krinski, 78 Vt. 162, 62 Atl. 37 (1905)
(Vermont had adopted the rule of exclusion in State v. Slamon, 73 Vt. 212, 50 Atl.
1097 [1901], as to letters, but the court here refused to apply it to liquor; the Slamon
case was repudiated in State v. Stacy, 104 Vt. 379, 401, 160 At. 257, 266 [1932], and
Vermont now admits all such evidence).
'=United 'States v. Stowell, 133 U. S. 1, 16, 10 Sup. Ct. 244, 247 (1890). It is also
suggested in some cases that the distinction rests upon the fact that the government
aight have obtained a warrant for such property but could not have obtained one for
non-contraband property, so it is placed in the same positions as if a warrant had been
applied for. The fact that possession could not be restored, when possession was
unlawful, had some weight when the motion to return was the regular practice, the
motion to suppress evidence without returning the property being a later growth.
Rosanski v. State, supra note 136.
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letter.

Most courts never drew such a distinction, and the United States

1
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected it.

8

At one time the Georgia courts, attempting to reconcile inconsistent
decisions on related questions, declared that a seizure from one's person
compelled him to give evidence against himself, whereas other seizures did
not. 139 But this distinction has been eliminated in favor of general
admissibility.140
Another exception covers evidence obtained by wire-tapping. The constitutional protection against search and seizure has been held inapplicable
to wire-tapping so even where wire-tapping is unlawful by statute, the
evidence is admissible under the rule that illegally obtained evidence is
competent if no constitutional right is violated.141 This was accepted even
in the federal courts, in the Otmstead case, 142 until 1937, when an astute
criminal lawyer seized upon an obscure provision of the Communications
Act of 1934 and persuaded a majority of the Court that Congress had thus
expressed its "intent" not merely to forbid wire-tapping but to ban the
evidence obtained thereby.143 Although the language is concededly susceptible of such interpretation, it is extremely doubtful that Congress realized
that it was dealing with probably the most controversial rule of evidence of
modem times. The Communications Act was designed "to provide for
the regulation of interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio,
and for other purposes". 144 The debates in Congress were entirely concerned with the communications "monopoly", and there was no specific
"'Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4 (1925) (narcotics inadmissible) ; Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 47 Sup. Ct. 248 (1927) (counterfeit
stamps); Gambino v. United States, 275 U. S. 310, 48 Sup. Ct. 137 (1927) (liquor).
See also People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 18, 150 N. E. 585, 586 (1926) ; Gore v. State,
24 Okla Cr. 394, 405, 218 Pac. 545, 549 (1923) ; State v. McDaniel, 115 Ore. 187, 231
Pac. 965 (1925).
"A search prosecuted in violation of the Constitution is not made lawful by what
it brings to light." Byars v. United States, supra.
'Hammock v. State, 1 Ga. App. 126, 58 S. E. 66 (1907), followed by a long line
of Georgia-Court of Appeals decisions.
'Calhoun v. State, 144 Ga. 679, 87 S. E. 893 (1916); Herndon v. State, 178 Ga.
832, 174 S. E. 597. (1934) (property unlawfully seized from person admitted).
' Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928); People v.
McDonald, 177 App. Div. 806, 165 N. Y. Supp. 41 (2d Dep't 1917) (although it is
probable that the New York statute did not apply to the police, the court nrakes no
decision on this point, holding the evidence admissible regardless); Rowan v. State, 3
AtI. (2d) 753 (Md. 1939) (admit wire-tapping evidence although its revelation in or
out of court is now a federal felony). Cf. Matter of J. Richard ("Dixie") Davis,
252 App. Div. 591, 299 N. Y. Supp. 632 (1st Dep't 1937) (admitted in disbarment
proceeding). And cf. State v. Hester, 137 S. C. 145, 134 S. E. 885 (1926) (dictaphone).
"eSupranote 141.
'47 U. S. C. A. § 605 (Supp. 1938). The pertinent clause is that "no person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person." The case is Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S.
379, 58 Sup. Ct. 275 (1937), rev'g 90 F. (2d) 630 (C. C. A. 2d 1937).
"'Title of the Act, 48 STAT. 1064 (1934).
See also §§ 1 and 2, on the scope and
application of the Act.
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reference to this section, tucked away among the "Miscellaneous Provisions"
with the repealer section and other odds and ends.145 The committee report
hardly mentions it. 146 It is probable that Congress simply intended, as an
incident to taking over the regulation of communications, to adopt penal
provisions such as are found in most states, which had never been held to
call for banning the evidence obtained by their violation. Congress itself was
not too pleased to learn that it had expressed this intent, and a few months
after this decision Senator Wheeler introduced a bill to permit wire-tapping
by officers if the head of any executive department or independent establishment of the government certifies that he reasonably-believes a violation of a
federal criminal statute which he is charged with enforcing will be discovered
by such means.147 The bill passed the Senate, and it passed the House on
the last day of the session, but was amended there and died in the closing
48
hours.1
But whatever Congress intended, the rule is now established. It makes
no provision for warrants to tap wires upon "probable cause", although
Justice Sutherland, in dissent, warns that we have enabled "the most depraved criminals to further their criminal plans over the telephone, in the
secure knowledge that even if these plans involve kidnapping and murder,
their telephone conversations can never be intercepted by officers of the
law and revealed in court.' 49 Although it is conceded that it would be
equivalent to a search warrant for evidence, such as is never permitted as
to tangible things, it would seem that the balance of policy should favor the
granting of a restricted privilege under court supervision. Lacking that,,
the temptation to indiscriminate tapping is enormous, for many clues may
.. When Senator Dill was explaining the provisions of the Act, he said, "In Title
VI will be found the miscellaneous provisions which are to provide for the transfer of
employees and the records and property of the Radio Commission... ." 78 CoNG. REc.
8826 (1934). There was no mention of the particular section. There was not even
this much in the House.
"Section 605, prohibiting
"'SEN. REP. No. 781, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 11.
unauthorized publication of communications, is based upon Section 27 of the Radio Act
and extends it to wire communitations." The section referred to, formerly 47 U. S.
C. A. § 107, under which there were no decisions, was enacted without mention either
in debates or committee reports. See SEN. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) ;
H. R. REP. No. 464, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) ; H. R. REP. No. 1886, 69th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1927). And it obviously was not concerned with rules of evidence, for radio
communications would not likely be used for criminal purposes.
In 1932, bills designed expressly to exclude evidence obtained by wire-tapping had
been introduced but had died in committee. S. 1396 and H. R. 5305 (72d Cong., 1st
Sess.). In 1933, there was inserted in the appropriation act for Prohibition enforcement a proviso that none of the appropriation should be expended for wire-tapping,
but there was no suggestion of excluding the evidence. 47 STAT. 1381 (1933).
'MS. 3756. It was reported by unanimous committees of both houses. SEN. REP. No.
1798 and H. R. REP. 2656, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. (1938).
'"The amendment imposed heavy penalties on officers tapping wires without proper
authority. The tragedy is that this committee amendment which resulted in the
death of the bill was simply repetitive of identical general provisions in § 501, and
added nothing whatever.
1
'Nardone v. United States, 302 U. S. 379, 385, 58 Sup. Ct. 275, 278 (1937).
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be uncovered thereby even if they cannot be used in court. Better to
provide a way to do it legally when the court is satisfied of the necessity,
and then to provide effective sanctions to keep the police within these
reasonable limits. But of that more later.
The Act, as thus interpreted, plainly excludes the evidence even though
obtained by a private individual,' 50 which is unlike the rule as to ordinary
search and seizure. 1 1 There is a conflict among the lower federal courts,
seeking vainly for the details of that imaginary Congressional intent, as to
whether the ban applies only to interstate communications intercepted, or to
all communications. 152 The second question has yet to come before the
153
Supreme Court, which has only ruled on the former.
Thus it must be conceded that the exceptions to the federal rule, although
some of them are sufficiently inionsistent to tend to discredit the rule,
are on the whole not of great significance.' 5 4 Argument founded on these
''See supra note 143. "No person.
'-Supra notes 68 and 118.
'The First and Fifth Circuits have squarely held that the Act only applies to interstate messages, and have admitted evidence of tapped local communications. Valli v.
United States, 94 F. (2d) 687 (C. C. A. 1st 1938) ; Ginsberg v. United States, 96 F.
(2d) 433 (C. C. A. 5th 1938). The Second Circuit has just held such evidence admissible. N. Y. Times, April 11, 1939, p. 46, col. 2 (the official title of the case is not
given; the defendants were Goldstein, Krupp, Weiss, and Gross).
But the contrary view, justified by the language of the section if not by the purported scope of the Act, has also been expressed. United States v. Plisco, 22 Fed. Supp.
242 (D. D. C. 1938) ; Sablowski v. United States, 101 F. (2d) 183 (C. C. A. 3rd, Dec.

9, 1938).
'The Nardone case concerned interstate messages. Although certiorari was granted
in the Valli case, 58 Sup. Ct. 760 (1938), the petitioner dismissed his appeal, 58 Sup.

Ct. 1053 (1938).
"'One more "exception", if such it can be called, is the universally recognized principle
that illegally obtained evidence is admissible in a civil action, for no question of violation
of constitutional rights is there involved. Generally it is immaterial that it was obtanied
by the party's own wrong. Mossman v. Thorson, 118 Ill. App. 574 (1905) (admitting
papers which one party induced the other to send to her P. 0. box by fraud) ; Sullivan
v. Nicoulin, 113 Iowa 76, 84 N. W. 978 (1901) (defendant claimed plaintiff's plastering
job defective but would not let his witnesses inspect it; they got in under an unlawful
court order but were allowed to testify) ; Cluett v. Rosenthal, 100 Mich. 193, 58
N. W. 1009 (1894) (copies of defendant's books made while held under a void
attachment; plaintiff's attorney had made the attachment and copies while employed
by another person; the Supreme Court had ordered him to return the copies to right
an abuse of process, Rosenthal v. Muskegon Circuit Judge, 98 Mich. 208, 57 N. W.
112 1[1893], but meanwhile he had taken the copies to this plaintiff, been retained, and
used them in evidence; held admissible because there was no abuse of process by
this plaintiff-other cases do not seem to regard the plaintiff's wrong as material);
Matter of Davis, 252 App. Div. 591, 299 N. Y. Supp. 632 (1st Dep't 1937) (wire-tapped
evidence admitted in disbarment proceedings; wires were tapped by police, and the court
suggests that "a very serious situation" would ?rise if it had been done by the petitioner) ;
DeLore v. Smith, 67 Ore. 304, 136 Pac. 13 (1913) (defendant testified to conversation between plaintiff and daughter on a country party line telephone) ; Stockfleth v. DeTastet, 4
Camp. 10, 171 Eng. Rep. 4 (N. P. 1814) (plaintiff's attorney, when acting for the
bankruotcy commissioners, had improperly examined defendant about plaintiff's claim;
Lord Ellenborough admitted the evidence although the attorney had abused the
authority of the Great Seal).
Many of the cases have arisen where court records, and the like, were removed from
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inconsistencies is weak, in that the best answer to such argument would be
to plug the gaps by statute. The rule must be attacked on broader grounds.
III.

PRO AND CON

What, then, are the arguments? When a person is illegally arrested
or his property illegally seized, what course is more consonant with sound
public policy? Although most of these arguments would apply equally to
arrest and to search and seizure, the controversy has centered around the
latter and we shall discuss the problem with special reference to search and
seizure.
The question is one upon which reasonable and honest men may differ,
and none be heard to say that the one group is seeking to set at naught our
constitutional liberties or that the other is seeking advantage for the criminal
classes.' 5 5 Although there has been an effort to separate the sheep from
the goats, to call the rule of exclusion the liberal view, no liberal need
apologize for espousing either view when we find three great liberal jurists
15 7
56
on
on the one side, Cardozo
in disagreement, Holmes and Brandeis
the files surreptitiously, without a proper court order. They are invariably held
admissible. Stevison v. Earnest, 80 Ill. 513 (1875) ; Citizens' National Bank of
Pocomoke City v. Custis, 153 Md. 235, 138 Atl. 261 (1927) ; Jordan v. Lewis, 14 East
305 note, 104 Eng. Rep. 618 (1740) ; Legatt v. Tollervey, 14 East 302, 104 Eng. Rep.
617 (1811). Cf. People v. Alden, 113 Cal. 264, 45 Pac. 327 (1896) (criminal case).
The same rule has been applied in a civil proceeding by the government to abate a
nuisance, even though there was an unconstitutional seizure. McColl v. Hardin ex rel.
State, 70 S. W. (2d) 327 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934). But that rests on interpretation of the
word "criminal" in a statute, for exclusion of the evidence does not rest on the constitution in Texas. The federal rule has recently been extended to exclude the evidence
in civil proceedings by the government to recover taxes. Rogers v. United States, 97 F.
(2d) 691 (C. C. A. 1st 1938),-ioted (1938) 6 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 113; Contra: Camden
County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F. (2d) 648 (D. N. J. 1930), app. dismissed, 46 F.
(2d) 655 (C. C. A. 3rd 1931) (revocation of license).
The rule in civil cases is a strange inversion of the criminal rules. A civil plaintiff
may not take advantage of his wrong in obtaining jurisdiction (supra note 30), but
may use evidence illegally obtained; the state may take advantage of its'officers' wrongs
in arresting defendants, but the federal rule will not permit the use of evidence illegally
obtained by them!
2"For some reason not easily ascertainable, a great deal of asperity appears in the
writings on the subject, particularly among those who can write free from any
responsibility except the judgment of their readers." Finch, J., in People v. Defore,
213 App. Div. 643, 652, 211 N. Y. Supp. 134, 142 (1st Dep't 1925).
'See particularly their dissents in the Olmstead case, supra note 141. Even Justice
Holmes did not always feel as strongly as he later did, for when on the Massachusetts
bench he declared, "The mode in which the officer got his knowledge of what the
girl had in her hand [by an unlawful search of her person] did not make the fact inadConceded
missible." Commonwealth v. Welch, 163 Mass. 372, 40 N. E. 103 (1895).
that he was faced with a long line of precedents, still Justice Holmes was not one
to state a rule he disapproved without at least mentioning that fact.
"'See People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926). It is true that he was
faced with the precedent of the Adams case, supra note 83, but a preliminary motion
was made by Defore, a basis on which many lesser judges had been able to cast aside
contrary precedents; Judge Cardozo's hands were free, and his ringing words reveal
that he and New York's greatest Court of Appeals made a free choice after a thorough
reexamination of the whole question. It has been suggested that Cardozo had been
converted before his death, for he joined the majority in the Nardone case, supra note
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the other. It is not a choice between a good principle and a bad principle
but between two good principles, and the problem is to strike a balance.
When the weight _ofthe federal courts is thrown onto the scales-though
their criminal jurisdiction is comparatively limited-the nation's courts are
about evenly divided. It has been said that the rule of admissibility is a
dying doctrine, because over a dozen states have been converted from that
rule to the rule of exclusion.' 5" But it was inevitable that a doctrine arising
at a very late date, with the prestige of the Supreme Court behind it, should
cause defections among the followers of an established rule. On the other
hand, four states, whose appellate courts had adopted the federal rule even
before the Supreme Court had made up its mind, re-examined the federal
rule after the Weeks case 159 and cast it aside. 60° And about nine states, considering the question for the first time, faced with the Weeks case and free
to choose, chose the rule of admissibility.' 61 A number of the other courts
that had long followed the rule of admissibility as a matter of course were
moved to re-examine the rule and declared unequivocally that the rule should
not be changed.' 6 2
The one all-inclusive argument for admitting evidence irrespective of
how it was obtained is that the manner of obtaining the evidence is immaterial
to the merits of the question before the court, namely the guilt or innocence
of the accused.' 63 And this is true whether the issue is raised before or at
the trial.'6

4

When a court is presented with the question of a defendant's

guilt, it needs all relevant reliable evidence, and it is illogical to suppress any
such evidence, either as compensation for a trespass or as punishment
149, but it must be remembered that no question of constitutional law or of policy was
before the Court. Congress had spoken, and the sole question was what it had
intended to say.
'Idaho, Illinois, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, and West Virginia. See cases cited supra
notes 91, 92 and 93. The others adopting the federal rule had had no earlier cases on
the point.
'Supra note 89.
"Georgia, Iowa, South Carolina, and Vermont. The cases are cited supra notes
88 and 93.
'Colorado, Delaware, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Utah, and Virginia. See cases cited mpra note 95.
'See the more recent of the cases from these states, cited supra note 95: Alabama,
California, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, South Carolina, and a few
others. These courts in particular do not speak like courts following a precedent
because of stare decisis. They have now heard the new arguments introduced by the
Weeks case, and they are unconvinced. Some of these opinions, like several of those
in the preceding footnote, are classics of their kind.
:""The defendant is released, not because he is innocent, but because the postal
inspector secured without instead of with a warrant the proofs of his guilt." Flagg
v. United States, 233 Fed. 481, 487 (C. C. A. 2d 1916) (reluctant concurring opinion
of Veeder, J.).
"Are the letters less criminal, if the person who stopped them did not punctually
observe the directions of that statute?" Bishop Atterbury's Trial, 16 How. St. Tr. 323,
630 (1723) (argument of counsel, adopted by the House of Lords).
"See State v. Fahn, 53 N. D. 203, 209, 205 N. W. 67, 69 (1925).
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of the officers for "dirty business". 165 The rejection of the evidence will
not punish the offending officer; it will punish all society. 166 As was said by
Judge Finch,
"To be unable to find a murderer guilty, although competent evidence
is before the court to warrant a conviction, for the reason that someone
else is guilty of petit larceny in connection with obtaining such evidence,
1 67
seems a handicap rather than a help to the administration of justice.'
The rules of evidence are designed to reach the truth and to secure a
fair trial to one accused of crime. 168 Evidence is no less reliable, no less
true, because obtained by other than nice ethical conduct-obtained, if you
will, by gross invasions of constitutional rights. If a criminal's arsenal is
discovered by an illegal search on mere suspicion, is the criminal to go free,
to resume his preying on society? True, he would have remained free if
the officer had observed the constitutional restraints, and not even a court
order could legalize such a search on mere suspicion-so much is necessary
to protect the innocent from lawless invasions of their privacy. But when
the invasion has occurred, when the court can look back and see that the
victim of the invasion was not innocent, then, although the officer's wrong
is the same and should be punished accordingly, the protection of the innocent
69
does not require the exclusion of evidence of guilt.'
This is not like the "third degree". Evidence extorted by such means is
inherently unreliable, since a person under such pressure would say anything
to buy peace. But the gun which is seized is just as much a gun, and is
just as much in the defendant's possession, whether it is seized legally or
illegally. A conversation heard upon a tapped wire is just as reliable as
one heard on the street-probably more so today, with modem recording
70
devices.1
' See State v. Dillon, 34 N. M. 366, 376-7, 281 Pac. 474, 478-9 (1929).
And there is remarkable language from the Supreme Court itself, in rejecting an
extension of the rule, which could well be used against the whole federal rule: "We
are concerned not with their [the officers'] liability but with the interest of the government in securing the benefit of the evidence seized." McGuire v. United States, 273
U.1 S. 95, 99, 47 Sup. Ct. 259 (1927).
"The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered." Cardozo, J.,

in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 21, 150 N. E. 585, 587 (1926).
"The sins of the [officer], for which the person aggrieved has not chosen to seek
redress or punishment, are visited upon the only party whose claim to consideration

is unimpeachable, namely the United States."

Flagg v. United States, 233 Fed. 481

(C. C. A. 2d 1916) (reluctant concurring opinion of Veeder, J.).
See also Chief Justice Taft's language in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.438,

468, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 569 (1928).
'People v. Defore, 213 App. Div. 643, 652, 211 N. Y. Supp. 134, 142 (1st Dep't
1925).
'See State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 235, 125 Atl. 636, 639 (1924); People v.
Esposito, 118 Misc. 867, 873, 194 N. Y. Supp. 326, 333 (Ct. Sp. Sess. 1922).
'As stated in State v. Chin Gim, 47 Nev. 431, 441, 224 Pac. 798, 800 (1924),
by1the contrary holding "the sanctity of the castle is converted into a sanctity for crime."
'In the brief of the American Civil Liberties Union against the admissibility of
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There is some suggestion that the admission of illegally obtained evidence
violates the presumption of innocence, in that the accused is considered
guilty and left to prove his way out.171

But the victim of an illegal seizure

is not, any more than any other accused, "considered guilty". The evidence
thus obtained is presented to the jury just as is any other competent evidence,
and the defendant, as in'all cases, must raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt.
The presumption of innocence does not go so far as to exclude proofs
tending to show the defendant's guilt! We must not pervert it to mean
that a man is conclusively presumed innocent until he gives himself away.
The issue then becomes whether there is a policy, some public necessity,
sufficiently strong to warrant excluding such evidence in spite of its tendency
to reach the truth. Certain "privileges" are recognized where such a public
policy exists, for "truth, like all the good things, may be loved unwisely, may
be pursued too keenly, may cost too much. '172 Mr. Justice Brandeis has
expressed great concern for the privacy of what is "whispered in the closet". 178
But crime operates by means of just such "whispers in the closet". And
when an officer, however unlawfully, has discovered positive evidence of
crime conducted by means of such "whispers", is there any public policy
that requires that its secrecy be preserved? Does it not rather demand
that the secret be dragged into the light? Whatever is "proper and confidential", to use again the words of Justice Brandeis, will not be exposed
in court, for if it is thus "proper", no crime being revealed thereby, it will
never appear in court. Likewise there should be no privilege for the private
arsenal or for other tangible evidences of crime.
In this connection, a fear has been expressed that freedom of opinion will
be endangered if such evidence may be received.173, A system of espionage
of the Old World variety is visioned, wherein one's privately expressed
opinions and his copy of Marx behind the door in the library'7 4 will be
ferreted out and used in evidence against him-for just .what crime is not
wire-tapped evidence, there is given a shocking account of inaccurate and perjured
evidence given by the officers who tapped the wires in the Ohlstead case. But this
argument has nothing to do with the illegal means of obtaining the evidence. Dishonest
witnesses can perjure one kind of evidence as well as another. Courts will always
receive conversations overheard on the street by casual bystanders, months after they
occurred, the inaccuracy of their hearing or their memory and the honesty of their
report going to the credibility of the testimony but not operating to exclude it.
"Delegate Dyett thus expressed himself in the Constitutional Convention. CONVENTION REcoRD (N. Y. 1938) 548-9.
1
'Pearse v. Pearse, 1 DeG. & Sm. 12, 28, 63 Eng. Rep. 950, 957 (1846), referring
to the attorney-client privilege.
"Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available
to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government,
by means far more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in
court of what is whispered in the closet." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S.
438,7 473, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928).
" See speech of Governor Lehman. N. Y. Times, June 18, 1938, p. 1, col. 2.
"'His copy of Das Kapital gave much concern to one of the delegates to the New

York Convention.
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made clear. So long as we have no political crimes, we need not fear that
such evidence will be used to our hurt. Some fear, perhaps justifiably, that
we may see again the Sedition Acts of old, and they feel that we should
begin now to exclude illegally obtained evidence and not set a precedent
which may be availed of at that time. But the government that so far
breaks with our time-honored traditions of freedom of speech and opinion,
that so far ignores Constitutional restrictions' 7" as to make one's views
criminal, will not be deterred by another tradition a quarter of a century old!
If we are to have political crimes, the necessary rules of evidence will come
in as their hand-maidens, even though we exclude them now. Therefore,
we need not fear that we are setting dangerous precedents for those who
will need none. The question is properly considered in the light of what
we, today, recognize as crimes. If the guardians of liberty will focus their
attention on the substantive law, they need not fear that any innocent man
will suffer from the admission of any reliable evidence.
Is there anything in the state or federal constitutions that requires that
the courts recognize such a privilege? None of them expressly so provide,
but efforts have been made so to construe several of the clauses of the
constitutions. It has universally been recognized that the admission of the
evidence does not violate the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As applied to judicial proceedings, due process requires only that
the accused have sufficient notice and adequate opportunity to defend.176
Defense attorneys seeking a constitutional theory upon which to rest
their demands" dug up and dusted off the gratuitous dictum of Justice
Bradley in the Boyd case,177 which had been but scotched in the Adams
case,1 7 8 and persuaded the Supreme Court that when evidence was obtained
by a violation of the Fourth Amendment, its use in court was a violation
of the Fifth in, that it compelled the defendant to "be a witness against himself". The result is the same to the defendant, it was said, whether he is
obliged himself to supply the evidence or whether it is taken from him by
179
an illegal seizure; in either case he is the unwilling source of the evidence.
The government could not lawfully compel the defendant. to produce the
evidence, so it cannot do so unlawfully. 8 0° But this argument proceeds
upon the premise that the Constitution confers an immunity from conviction
upon evidence which a person is able to conceal from open view or from
.. Prof. R. E. Cushman, in 1 ENCY. Soc. Sci. (1930) 635, expresses the opinion that
the Sedition Act was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court never passed upon it.
Cf. 6Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 57 Sup. Ct. 732 (1937).
" Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 186, 93 So. 293, 303 (1921) (full discussion) ; People
v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 28, 150 N. E. 585, 590 (1926). Cf. Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14 (1908).
1116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886).
1"192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372 (1904).
'See particularly Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 306, 41 Sup. Ct. 261 (1921).
"See State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 669, 114 S. E. 261, 265 (1922).
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lawful process-that it would be unfair to make a defendant the instrument
of his own destruction. This is a doctrine as dangerous as it is questionable.
The federal cases look to Entick v. Carrington.'8 ' as their guide-but it was
there said by Lord Camden that the prohibition against compelling selfincrimination rests on the fact that "The necessary means of compelling
self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be
both cruel and unjust." There is no suggestion that all evidence of which
the defendant is the "unwilling source" is to be excluded. And it might
be added that the defendant is as much the "unwilling source" of evidence
seized under lawful warrant, yet it has never been suggested (except in the
Boyd dictum) that evidence so obtained could not be used. 8 2 Professor Wigmore declares, 8 3 and the cases support him, 8 4 that the Fifth Amendment
concerns only testimonial compulsion, statements and evidence which one
is compelled to make or produce under court process directed against him as
a witness, either before or at the trial. When the defendant is not himself
compelled to produce the evidence, when it is seized by an officer lawfully
or unlawfully, the evidence given on the stand is not his but is the evidence
of the officer testifying about his own observations; and the real evidence,
the article seized, speaks for itself and is not evidence given by the accused. 8 5
But the privilege against self-incrimination is no protection to a corporation. 8 6 So a new trick was pulled out of the bag in the Silverthorne case,8 7
which rested the federal rule on a new ground: that the prohibition against
unreasonable search and seizure extends not only to the fact of search and
seizure but to every incident of it.'55 Since the purpose of the search was
to obtain evidence, it is pure sophistry to declare, as courts frequently have
done, 8 9 that the search and the subsequent use of the evidence are distinct
'19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
'That such evidence could be used was the clearest holding in Adams v. New

York, supra note 178, and this much of the Boyd dictum has never recovered. See
also Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 178-9, 138 At. 679, 681 (1927), and
dissent in State v. Owens, 302 Mo. 348, 397, 259 S. W. 100, 115 (1924).
uI4 WIa ORE, EvIDENcE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2263 ff.
'See, on its application to search and seizure, Banks v. State, Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, and other cases cited infra note 185.
'Banks v. State, 207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293 (1921), cert. den., 260 U. S. 736, 43 Sup.
Ct. 96 (1922); People v. LeDoux, 155 Cal. 535, 102 Pac. 517 (1909); State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 Atl. 636 (1924) ; State v. Johnson, 116 Kan. 58, 226 Pac.
245 (1924) ; State v. Rogne, 115 Minn. 204, 132 N. W. 5 (1911) ; Pringle v. State, 108
Miss. 802, 67 So. 455 (1915) ; State v. Pomeroy, 130 Mo. 489, 32 S. W. 1002 (1895) ;

State v. Flynn, 36 N. H. 64 (1858); Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138
Atl. 679 (1927); State v. Atkinson, 40 S. C. 363, 18 S. E. 1021 (1894).
Cf. State
v. Miller, 71 N. J. L. 527, 60 Atl. 202 (1905), and Matter of Schmidt v. District
Attorney, 255 App. Div. 353, 8 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 787 (4th Dep't 1938) (medical
examination). See note in this issue, (1939) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 437.
"'Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 74, 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 378 (1906).
251 U. S. 385, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 (1920).
'See dissent in State v. Prescott, 125 S. C. 22, 117 S. E. 637 (1923).
"See People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac. 435 (1922); State v. Reynolds, 101
Conn. 224, 125 Atl. 636 (1924) ; State v. Chuchola, 32 Del. 133, 120 Atl. 212 (Ct. Gen.
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transactions. But, distinct transaction or no, there is much room to question
whether it was ever intended to impose this additional sanction. The provision operates upon legislatures to bar them forever from making unreasonable searches and seizures lawful, upon executives to bar them from enforcing
such laws, and upon the courts to bind them to punish such searches and
seizures whether made with or without legislative sanction. 190 But the
Constitution lays down no rule of evidence. This provision was "designed
to protect the intimate sanctity of the person and the home from invasion
by the state.... The Constitution and the laws of the land are not solicitous
to aid persons charged with crime to conceal or sequester evidence of their
iniquity."'19 When the invasion of the home has been effected, the violation
of the Constitution is complete. It is neither the possession of property
nor the use of evidence, but the sanctity of homes, that ig the concern of
the Constitutional guaranty.
This surely is the correct view historically.

For while the proponents

of the rule of exclusion look fondly back to Entick v. Carrington 92 as the
parent of their rule, that case is far from authority for them. It granted
datages to Entick against the instigator of the search, but nowhere in the
opinion is there a suggestion that the evidence should be suppressed and
the officers be compelled to purge their minds of all knowledge gained
thereby.193 Nor did James Otis, when he made his great speech in Boston
denouncing the writs of assistance, concern himself with the use of the evi.dence; it was the invasion of homes that prompted him to make his attack."'
It was never the law of England, of the Colonies, or of any state in the
Union until more than a century after the Revolution, yet we are glibly
told that it is a fundamental right of Englishmen that no evidence illegally
taken from them may be used against them!
But it is said that excluding the evidence is the only practical means of
making the Constitutional guaranty effective. Reserving the question of
the ineffectiveness of other remedies, just what does this "more effective"
Sess. 1922) ; State v. Johnson, 116 Kan. 58, 226 Pac. 245 (1924) ; State v. Dillon, 34
N. M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1929).
See
"Judge Lumpkin in Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624 (1897).
also Adams v. New York, supra note 178.
"People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 249, 251, 205 Pac. 435, 440 (1922).
"'19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
u'Lord Camden gives as the reason for the privilege against self-incrimination that
"'the necessary means of compelling self-accusatibn, falling upon the innocent as well
as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust." The same reason is implicit in the bar
of a general search for evidence. But a search could only be "cruel and unjust"
to the innocent at the time of the invasion of the home, not at the admission of the
evidence. The search of the innocent would reveal no incriminating evidence, and there
would be none to admit; the hardship, if any, would fall only on the guilty. Only the
o btaining, not the subsequent use, is cruel and unjust to the innocent. See State v.
Dillon, 34 N. M. 366, 373, 281 Pac. 474, 477 (1929).
"'The significant portion of the speech will be found in 2 WATsoN, THE CONSTITUTION
(1910) 1416.
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remedy add? To the rights of the innocent man it would add not one iota.
The speeches in the New York Constitutional Convention are replete with
harrowing stories of innocent victims of vicious searches in which no evidence
was found. 19 5 The speakers then go on to say that the constitutional guaranty
is meaningless if the evidence is admissible. But they fail utterly to connect
up these two points and show how the innocent victim is helped in the slightest
by the fact that the evidence which was not found would be inadmissible!
As a means of reparation for a wrong done an innocent man, the exclusion
of evidence is no help.196
The only person benefitted by the suppression of incriminating evidence
is the guilty man with something to conceal. 197 True, his constitutional
rights have been violated, but are we justified in providing an additional
remedy, above those ordinarily granted to individuals who have been wronged,
a remedy useful only to a law-violator? It has been said by Judge Learned
Hand that "the Constitution protects the guilty along with the innocent. '"' "8
It might more accurately be said, as in the Weeks case,19 9 that it protects
those accused of crime, because of the possibility-the presumption-that they
are. innocent. But should it be so interpreted as to shield those faced with
actual evidence of their guilt from just punishment therefor? Judge Seabury
well expressed the thought a few years ago:
"As we look at some of the uses which the criminal classes have
made of constitutional provisions, one might suppose that the far-seeing
barons who wrung the great charter from King John at Runnymede
were intent upon safeguarding the twentieth century racketeer, gangster, kidnapper, gunman and corrupt political leader in the prosecution
of their sinister vocations. It ought to be possible to find a way, by
judicial interpretation, to use these constitutional provisions for the
protection of liberty without giving them such fanciful and far-fetched
interpretations as to convert them into a weapon by which criminals can
'200
make war safely upon organized society and its law-abiding members.
9
"S
ee particularly pages 487-92 of the Convention Record.
'Whether it Nqill help the innocent victims indirectly by discouraging further searches
will be considered presently.
"'It would have been consoling and gratifying to the defendant, of course, if the
judge had . . . [returned] his whisky, with an apology, and without allowing the
state to prove that the whisky was found in the defendant's possession. Perhaps that
would have atoned for the sheriff's wrongdoing as far as the defendant was concerned, but how about the law-abiding public? They are . . . the complainants in
both accusations." State v. Eddins, 161 La. 240, 247, 108 So. 468, 470 (1926).
'United States v. Casino, 286 Fed. 976, 978 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
"'232 U. S. 383, 392, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 344 (1914).
"'Address at annual dinner of American Law Institute, May 7, 1932. (1932) 18

A. B. A. J. 371.
Cf. the language of Chief Justice Marshall of Ohio in Rosanski v. State, 106 Ohio

St. 442, 462, 140 N. E. 370, 376 (1922): "If all the doctrines which are being urged
by attorneys representing . . . law violators should be adopted by the courts as the
true interpretation of our sacred Bill of Rights, it would no longer be recognized
as a charter of government and as a guaranty of protection of the weak against the
aggressions of the strong, but rather as a charter of unbridled license and a certificate
of character to the criminal classes."
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There is another argument that is made, apart from all questions of
constitutional construction. It is the argument of public policy, that the
court should not ratify the illegal search by receiving the evidence obtained
thereby. Although it is conceded that no officer is authorized to commit
a crime on behalf of the government, and an officer's illegal acts are beyond
the scope of his authority, yet it is argued that if the government, through
the courts, avails itself of the fruits of the officer's crime, it thereby sanctions
the illegal means by which the evidence was obtained. 20 ' The fact that
evidence of crime was found by a search unlawful in its inception does not
purge the search of its illegality. This much must be admitted. 202 For we
cannot accept the philosophy that the end justifies the means, that the lawviolating officer is to be excused if his offense reveals another.203 But does it
follow that the court, in accepting the evidence, is "allowing such iniquities
to succeed" ?204 Both the officers and the courts are peculiarly charged with
the duty of enforcing the Constitution and the laws. When one of these
agencies fails this duty and itself violates the law, the other is derelict in its
duty if it then refuses to enforce the law. It should not be within the power
of one of these agencies, the officers, to tie the hands of the other, the
'See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341 (1914); State v.
Arregui, 44 Ida. 43, 254 Pac. 788, 792 (1927) ; Gore v. State, 24 Okla. Cr. 394, 218
Pac. 545, 550 (1923); State v. Wills, 91 W. Va. 659, 114 S. E. 261 (1922); Hoyer
v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 193 N. W. 89 (1923).
The same argument was made in connection with illegal arrest, but was almost
universally rejected, even by the United States Supreme Court. Two state cases and
a since discredited federal case accepted the argument. State v. Simmons, 39 Kan.
262, 18 Pac. 177 (1888) ; Re Robinson, 29 Neb. 135, 45 N. W. 267 (1890) ; Tennessee
v. Jackson, 36 Fed. 258, 1 L. R. A. 370 (E. D. Tenn. 1888).
'Nevertheless, some eighteen states, including nine which adopt the federal rule
as to search and seizure, have declared by statute or decision that an arrest, even without
any justification whatever, may become lawful if it develops that a felony has in
fact been committed. See supra note 46.
And those who throw up their hands in holy horror at the idea of judging an
officer's crime by its results should be reminded that this concept is no -stranger to
our law. A simple assault may become a far graver offense if the victim happens
to land on his head, and driving seventy miles an hour through a school zone is
a misdemeanor or a felony, depending upon its results. However, we shall not labor
this point, for there are less debatable grounds upon which to rest the argument.
'"To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the
means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution." Justice Brandeis'
dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 (1928).
See also Byars v. United States, 273 U. S. 28, 29, 47 Sup. Ct. 248 (1927) ; Town of
Blacksburg v. Beam, 104 S. C. 146, 88 S. E. 441 (1916).
"Justice Holmes dissenting in Olmstead v. United States, supra note 203 at 470.
just why the government is permitted to "adopt the unlawful seizure" in forfeiture
cases yet may not do so for the purpose of using the evidence is hard to fathom. But
Justice Holmes says that they rest upon a different footing. Dodge v. United States,
Canada likewise draws a distinction-and
272 U. S. 530, 47 Sup. Ct. 191 (1926).
reaches opposite results on each point! Supra note 98.
Furthermore, the court just as much takes advantage of a wrong when it uses
evidence wrongfully obtained by a private individual, but of all the judicial votaries
of the federal rule only Justices Holmes and Brandeis have seen this. See their
dissent in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 41 Sup. Ct. 574 (1921).
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courts, and thus confer a virtual immunity upon an offender against society.
Two wrongs do not make a right, and the courts do not ratify or condone
one wrong by refusing to apply to it indirect sanctions that operate not to
punish that wrongdoer but to release another in the face of evidence of
his guilt! The plain duty of the court is to punish every wrong that is
brought to its attention, and if existing sanctions for this purpose are
inadequate, the energies of the Legislature should be directed to devising
more effective direct remedies. 205
For the same reason, the "unclean hands" argument, which is occasionally
raised, 206 must be rejected. Equity, so far as it has as its object the redress
of private wrongs, can afford to refuse its extraordinary aid to those who
have acted unfairly in connection with the transaction. But criminal courts
exist for the protection of society, and they fail this purpose, this duty, if they
release a prisoner in the face of evidence of his guilt because another has
failed the same duty.
There is another important argument of public policy which must be met.
It is best expressed by Justice Brandeis:
"In a government of laws, the existence of the government will be
imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the
Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; 20it7
invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."
It is true that public respect for law is gravely impaired when the police
disregard constitutional safeguards. But public confidence is equally betrayed
when criminals escape punishment for demonstrable guilt. Far better it
would be to provide effective means to punish both the offending officer and
the criminal whose crime is thus fortuitously revealed.
In this connection we are told that conviction of a person by such evidence
"shocks the common man's sense of decency and fair play".208 This is what
old Jeremy Bentham so aptly labeled the Fox-Hunter's Reason, introducing
into criminal law the sportsman's concept of fairness.2 0 9 Not every man has
pursued the wily fox, but every fair-minded citizen, when he was a child
'vThe argument of the federal courts on this point is best repudiated in Williams v.
State, 100 Ga. 211, 28 S.E. 624 (1897); State v. Eddins, 161 La. 240, 108 So. 468
(1926); Commonwealth v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N. E. 11 (1923); Hall v.
Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727, 121 S.E. 154 (1924).
'See Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United States, supra note 203 at 483.
"Dissent in Olmstead v. United States, supra note 203 at 485.
"The shock to the sensibilities of the average citizen when his government violates
a constitutional right of another is far more evil in its effect than the escape of any
criminal through the courts' observance of those rights." State v. Arregui, 44 Ida.
43, 58, 254 Pa&. 788, 792 (1927).
'Brandeis, J., dissenting in Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465, 477, 41 Sup.
Ct. 574 (1921).
'BE:NTHAm, Rationale of Judicial Evidence in 7 WORKS (Bowring's ed. 1843) 452 ff.
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playing "cops and robbers",2 1 knew that if the "cops" took unfair advantage
of the "robbers", the captured robbers had to be released and given a new
chance to hide. And this admirable spirit of fair play is carried over in the
minds of many citizens and is applied by them to the real-life "cops and
robbers" situation. But we must remember that this is not a harmless game
engaged in by equals, and that there are other factors to be considered besides
the wrong done by one group of children to another--that the robbers released
will not run harmlessly off to hide under Mrs. O'Leary's back porch, but
will resume their real-life killing and thieving. The rules of sport are
conducive to the end sought-amusement--but they are ill-adapted to the
enforcement of the criminal law.2 1 ' And if the application of the rule could
be divorced from popular prejudices concerning the liquor, gambling, and
revenue laws, in the enforcement of which the federal rule saw its greatest
growth,2 12 and if a murderer, bank robber, or kidnapper 213 should go free
in the face of evidence of his guilt, the public would surely arise and condemn
2 14
the helplessness of the courts against the depredations of the outlaws.
The final argument for the federal rule is that all direct remedies are
ineffective to discourage those charged with law enforcement from seeking
evidence by illegal means. It has already been pointed out that, as an
additional means of reparation for a wrong done, the suppression of incriminating evidence can benefit only the guilty. As a punishment of the officer,
the release of his quarry is of doubtful value. But it may have a very real
effect in discouraging the authorities from using such means in the first in215
stance, if they are not to be able to use the product of their acts.

If it

has this effect, it cannot be denied that innocent as well as guilty will benefit.
But here we have two vital social needs, the need that crime be repressed
and the need "that the law shall not be flouted by the insolence of office".2 16
'1 Now called "G-men and racketeers."

'It hardly seems cricket to borrow words from the Supreme Court to support
this thesis, but in 1927 Justice Stone declared: "A criminal prosecution is more than
a game in which the Government may be checkmated and the game lost merely
because its officers have not played according to rule." McGuire v. United States,

273 U. S.95, 99, 47 Sup. Ct. 259 (1927)

(in refusing to extend the federal rule).

'An extensive sampling of cases following the federal rule reveals that the great

majority of these cases involved seizure of liquor.

"'The evidence used against Hauptmann, the kidnapper of the Lindbergh baby, was
seized without a warrant; would it have served the cause of justice-and would public

respect for law have been enhanced-if this evidence had been excluded? (The source
of this information is the speech of Justice Lewis in the New York Constitutional
Convention of 1938. REcORD, p. 470. Since the law is settled in New Jersey, it is not
mentioned in the report of the case. State v. Hauptmann, 115 N. J. L. 412, 180
Atl. 809 [1935]).
r'See Roberts v. People, 78 Colo. 55, 243 Pac. 544, 545 (1926).
'The federal rule does not follow this policy to its logical conclusion. It has already

been pointed out that the evidence so obtained may be used to convict the truck-driver
and the still-tender. It is the "higher-up" who owns the property who is protected.
Connolly v. Medalie, 58. F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A. 2d 1932).
"'People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24, 150 N. E. 585, 589 (1926).
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When these vital needs come in conflict, we must move cautiously, lest in our
zeal to promote one, we neglect the other. It is much to be doubted, in any
event, whether the evil is as widespread as many judges and speakers would
have us believe; no factual study has been found. However, in the absence
of a factual study of our own, we must meet the problem as if illegal searches
21 7
and seizures were every bit as prevalent as is claimed.
Has this rule, then, had the effect of discouraging such methods? The
large number of cases of illegal searches that continue to arise long after
the federal rule is well established in a jurisdiction casts substantial doubt upon
its efficacy. 218 The well-meaning over-zealous officer will not, of course, be
deterred by such a rule, for he is probably unaware that his act is unreasonable. And the officer who wilfully abuses his power to show his authority
will hardly be deterred by a sanction not directed at him personally. The
beneficial effect of the rule, if any it has, must be with respect to police
departments whose settled policy is to get evidence in such manner-and
if this is their policy, it will continue, for the value of the raid on suspicion
and the tapping of wires is fully as great for "getting a lead" as it is for
getting evidence useful in court. With the clues thus obtained, which might
be sufficient in themselves to convince any jury, the police are thus better
armed to go through the formality of seeking out further evidence that a court
will accept. Such "fishing expeditions" will not be checked by any such
indirect means as rejecting the evidence in court. Therefore, it is to be
questioned whether the bare possibility of deterring official lawlessness by
this indirect means is sufficient to overweigh the certainty of turning criminals
loose.
Justices Cardozo and Holmes both recognized that this is a question of
balancing social interests, and they reached opposite conclusions as to which
is the lesser evil. The argument of each is wholly speculative, neither
appearing to rest on a factual study. This question, like many questions of
law, rests ultimately on a questior of fact, yet not one of the courts that
have passed on it has ever indicated that it had made the factual study that
must underlie its conclusion that this remedy will or will not be effective, that
one or the other is the lesser evil. Wise judgments cannot be based on mere
"'King John, in Magna Charta (clause 55), pledged: "We will not make any justices, constables, sheriffs or bailiffs, but of such as know the law of the realm, and
mean duly to observe it." But it is certain that, to an unknown extent, some officers
are not of that caliber. THE POLICEMAN'S PocKET LAw BOOK (1924) 101 contains
the following words: "What is the highest law? The law of necessity is the highest
law known to man-it is supreme even over the written Constitution." See LAWzLEssNESS rN LAw ENFORCEMENT, infra note 223, at 106; unfortunately the study does not
cover the application of this "legal principle" fo search and seizure or to arrest.
'The latest A. L. R. annotation cites some 300 such cases, over a six-year period,
reaching appellate courts in jurisdictions where the federal rule was well settledand a correspondingly large number of cases probably arose in trial courts that
were not appealed because the exclusion of the evidence prevented a conviction. See
(1934) 88 A. L. R. 340.
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speculation and unproved assumptions. 219 There is one factual study that
has been made of the effect of the federal rule upon law enforcement in
Detroit.220 Professor Waite of Michigan found that at least one-quarter
of those arrested in Detroit for unlawfully carrying concealed weapons were
discharged not because they were innocent but because the weapon-indisputable eviilence of guilt-had been unlawfully discovered. There were 1,347
armed robberies in Detroit in the year studied, and the gun-toters who
were released no doubt had their part in them. This seems a high price to
pay for a rule that may possibly discourage illegal enforcement. 221
The argument that the federal rule hampers efficient law enforcement
must be most closely scrutinized, however. For, as Connor Hall so aptly
pointed out in one of the early forays in this great battle,222 if the direct
remedies against the officers are as effective as their advocates claim, then
equally will criminals go free and law enforcement be inefficient. However,
if illegal enforcement is thereby checked, it will be a real boon to the innocent
citizen, and to gain this benefit we may tolerate some inefficiency in law
enforcement. Yet there will always be some over-zealous and some brutal
officers, who are no more checked by direct remedies than by indirect, but
at least the direct remedy punishes them, not society; and when, by whatever
means, a court is presented with evidence of two crimes, it should punish
both, whereas today under the federal rule it may punish neither. In Detroit
and probably elsewhere, the "indirect remedy" has not discouraged illegal
enforcement. It h=s released known criminals in the face of evidence of
their guilt.
Let us consider for a moment how these principles have been applied to
confessions unlawfully extorted. 22 Of course, no court will receive confessions obtained as a result of torture or fear, and most courts will reject
them if motivated by hope of any material benefit. 224 The nature and degree
of the hope or fear which is necessary to exclude the confession need not
2
"Knowledge is essential to understanding, and the understanding should precede
judging." Dissent of Justice Brandeis in Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504,
520, 44 Sup. Ct. 412 (1924).
'Waite, Public Policy and the Arrest of Felons (1933) 31 MICH. L. REv. 749, 763 ff.
'Since this study was published, Michigan has retreated from the federal rule to
the extent of making weapons admissible. Supra note 94.
Professor Waite states, further, that in his observation the rule encourages illegal
practices, for if the police cannot prosecute an arrested lawbreaker even on positive
evidence which they have found, they tend to take the punishment into their own
hands-whiEh at least discourages the lawbreaker and silences press criticism of
ineffective enforcement.
---Hall, Evidence and the Fourth Amendment (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 646, 647.
'A full study of the prevalence of the "third degree" is found in NATIONAL COMMISSION
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-AUnder N. Y. CODE CRI. PRoC. § 395, a confession is not rendered inadmissible
by the fact that it was induced by hope of benefit except where a promise of immunity
has been made by or by the authority of the district attorney. But this is not the
law in most states.
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concern us here. 225 The important fact to note is that, with rare exceptions,
the courts have recognized that the rejection of such evidence is grounded
not upon the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, not upon
any policy against ratifying the unlawful means or against encouraging such
practices, but squarely and solely upon the ground that a confession so
induced is unreliable.2 26 This distinction in theory is vitally important when
the extorted confession leads to the discovery of independent facts, such as
the location of stolen property or of the victim's body. 227 No case has ever
-refused to receive evidence of these independent facts, 228 and the great
'Here again there may be said to be a federal rule, which follows the earlier

English cases in excluding anything but the spontaneous outpourings of a troubled
-conscience. The least urging or inducement will exclude the confession. Bram v.
United States, 168 U. S. 532, 18 Sup. Ct. 183 (1897) ; Ziang Sung Wan v. United
States, 266 U. S. 1, 45 Sup. Ct. 1 (1924) ; State v. Brick, 2 Harring. 530 (Del. 1835) ;
Green v. State, 88 Ga. 518, 15 S. E. 10 (1891) ; and many cases cited in the Brain case,
.supra. Under this rule, "It would be best to tell the truth" is sufficient to exclude the
evidence. Contra: People v. Randazzio, 194 N. Y. 147, 155, 87 N. E. 112, 115 (1909)
King v. State, 40 Ala. 314 (1867).
The courts vary on how much is necessary to exclude the confession. Rough
handling is generally sufficient. Lang v. State, 178 Wis. 114, 189 N. W. 558 (1922).
But in New York it is simply considered on the basic question of voluntariness.
People v. Trybus, 219 N. Y. 18, 113 N. E. 538 (1916).
Fear of mob violence is
-sufficient to exclude the confession. Taylor v. Commonwealth, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 836,
42 S. W. 1125 (1897) ; Walker v. State, 2 Tex. App. 326 (1877). Agitation resulting
from being shown his father's mangled body is not sufficient. State v. Crank, 2 Bailey
Law 66, 77 (S. C. 1831).
Placing the accused in a "sweat box" or dark, airless
cell will exclude the resultant confession. Ammons v. State, 80 Miss. 592, 32 So.

9 (1902).

The courts disagree on whether illegally prolonged custody or questioning will
-exclude the confession. It is material to the question of voluntariness, but is usually
held not sufficient in itself to exclude the confession. People v. Mummiani, 258 N. Y.
.394, 180 N. E. 94 (1932) ; State v. Kirby, 1 Strob. 378 (S. C. 1847). Contra: Regina
v. Berriman, 6 Cox Crim. 388 (N. P. 1854). In Kentucky, a statute excludes con-fessions obtained by "plying" with questions while in custody. Ky. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin 1936) § 1649b; Commonwealth, v. McClanahan, 153 Ky. 412, 155 S. W. 1131
(1913).
This statute does not refer, to a single question but to persistent, repeated
,questions. Commonwealth v. Long, 171 Ky. 132, 188 S. W. 334 (1916).
'The constitutional privilege relates only to testimonial compulsion directed against
the defendant as a witness, and has no connection with extra-judicial confessions. See 2
WIGM ORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 823; State v. Turner, 82 Kan. 787, 109 Pac. 654
(1910) ; Baughman v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441, 267 S. W. 681 (1924); People
v. Mahon, 15 N. Y. 384, 386 (1857) ; Duffy v. People, 26 N. Y. 589 (1863).
But courts have frequently confused these very similar principles and rested on
-the ground of self-incrimination. Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 18 Sup. Ct.
183 (1897) ; People v. Loper, 159 Cal. 6, 112 Pac. 720 (1910) ; Evans v. State, -106 Ga.
519, 32 S. E. 659 (1899) ; State v. Simpson, 157 La. 614, 102 So. 810 (1925) ; Jordan
v. State, 32 Miss. 382 (1856)
(promptly repudiated in Belote v. State, 36 Miss. 96
[1858]); State v. Thomas, 250 Mo. 189, 157 S. W. 330 (1913); Lang v. State, 178
Wis. 114, 189 N. W. 558 (1922).
- A closely related problem is involved in the cases on compulsory medical examinations and forcible comparison of shoe tracks, discussed in a note in this issue.
(1939) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 437.
"This statement is just a little too strong. Jordan v. State, 32 Miss. 382 (1856),
which rested its holding upon self-incrimination, brought out the whole armory of
reasons which were later used for the federal rule on search and seizure-the constitutional protection extending to every incident of the violation, the court sanctioning the
-means, etc. The case was promptly overruled in Belote v. State, 36 Miss. 96 (1858),
in which counsel cited the case but the court did not. In time even defense counsel
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weight of authority will receive in addition so much of the confession as is
thereby shown to be true, as evidence of defendant's knowledge of the
criminatory facts, which he is then left to reconcile with his innocence if
he can. 229 Similarly, if a confession is procured by means of the most
tired of citing it. In spite of the adoption of the federal rule in Mississippi, it still
adheres to the prevailing view on this related question. Smith v. State, 166 Miss.
893, 144 So. 471 (1932).
'The prevailing view admits the facts found and so much of the confession as
relates strictly to those facts and is explanatory of the discovery.. Thus, the fact that
the property or body was found as a result of defendant's information will be admitted
to show his knowledge of the location. Lewis v. State, 220 Ala. 461, 125 So. 802
(1930); Shufflin v. State, 122 Ark. 606, 184 S. W. 454 (1916); People v. Hoy Yen,
34 Cal. 176 (1867); Osborne v. People, 83 Colo. 4, 262 Pac. 892 (1927); State v.
Brick, 2 Harring. 530 (Del. 1835) ; Rusher v. State, 94 Ga. 366, 21 S. E. 593 (1894) ;
People v. Ascey, 304 Ill. 404, 136 N. E. 766 (1922) ; State v. Moran, 131 Iowa 645,
109 N. W. 187 (1906) ; State v. Turner, 82 Kan. 787, 109 Pac. 654 (1910) ; Baughman
v. Commonwealth, 206 Ky. 441, 267 S. W. 681 (1924); Commonwealth v. Knapp, 9
Pick. 496, 511 (Mass. 1830) ; Smith v. State, 166 Miss. 893, 144 So. 471 (1932);
State v. Simas, 25 Nev. 432, 62 Pac. 242 (1900) ; State v. Due, 27 N. H. (7 Foster)
256 (1853); Duffy v. People, 26 N. Y. 589 (1863), aff'g 5 Park. Cr. 321 (Sup. Ct.
1862) ; State v. Lowry, 170 N. C. 730, 87 S. E. 62 (1915) ; Laros v. Commonwealth,
84 Pa. 200 (1877); Dupuis v. State, 14 Ohio App. 67 (1918); State v. Danelly,
116 S. C. 113, 107 S. E. 149 (1921); Collins v. State, 169 Tenn. 393, 88 S. W.
(2d) 452 (1935) ; State v. Conklin, 109 Vt.-, 194 Atl. 378 (1937) ; United States v.
Richard, Fed. Cas. No. 16154 (C. C. D. C. 1823) (the last case on the point in any
federal court!); Rex v. Lockhart, 1 Leach C. C. 386, 168 Eng. Rep. 295 (1785)
see 2 EAsT P. C. (1803) 658.
Under this view, it is improper to admit defendant's admission that he stole the
goods or placed them in the place where they were found, since nothing but his
knowledge of the location is corroborated by the discovery. And the-goods must be
identified independently of the confession, because the accused might have given up money
or property of his own to buy peace. Whitley v. State, 78 Miss. 255, 28 So. 852 (1900) ;
State v. Due, supra (both reversing on this ground; the rule is so stated in the
other cases above).
Profs. Wigmore and Chamberlayne have attacked these limitations on the rule,
believing that the partial corroboration is sufficient to give some credit to the confession as a. whole. 2 WiGmoRE, EvmENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 858; 2 CHAEXBERLAYNE,
§ 1614. Their view is adopted by statute in Texas,
MODmN" LAW OF EVMENCE (1911)
TEx. CODE CRIm. Paoc. (Vernon 1926) § 727; Greer v. State, 116 Tex. Cr. 491, 32
It has had occasional support in the cases. Frederick v.
S. W. (2d) 845 (1930).
State, 3 W. Va. 695 (1869) ; Rex v. Griffin, Russ. & R. 151, 168 Eng. Rep. 732 (1809)
(Lord Ellenborough, admitting the money surrendered by the accused, without independent identification; the same court on the same day, by a slight realignment of the
judges, "Ellenborough dubitante", went the other way in Rex v. Jones, Russ. & R. 152,
168 Eng. Rep. 733 [1809]; the ground of distinction is difficult to perceive); Regina
v. Gould, 9 Car. & P. 364, 173 Eng. Rep. 870 (N. P. 1840) (admitting statement
that he had placed the lantern where it was found). And see dissent in Berry v. United
States, 2 Colo. 186 (1873).
A few English decisions have gone to the other extreme from the Griffin case, supra,
and, while admitting the facts found, refuse to permit any reference to the confession
or any showing that the defendant had knowledge. Rex v. Warickshall, 1 Leach C. C.
263, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783); Rex v. Harvey, 2 East P. C. 658 (1800) ; Regina
v. Berriman, 6 Cox Crim. 388 (N. P. 1854). Only one jurisdiction in the United
States follows this rule. State v. Simpson, 157 La. 614, 102 So. 810 (1925) (resting
on self-incrimination but avoiding the logical conclusion that the facts found thereby
should also be excluded).
It was suggested in Rusher v. State, 94 Ga. 366, 21 S. E. 593 (1894) that if
violence had been used on the defendant instead of mere fear, all the fruits would
be suppressed as a matter of public policy, but this dictum has never been applied and
its validity has been. questioned, in Williams v. State, 100 Ga. 511, 28 S. E. 624 (1897).
The rule in Georgia is already confused enough without this. " For a series of incon-
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reprehensible of deception, it is fully admissible if the deception was not
such as might make the confession untrue.23 0 This is perfectly defensible
on the theory that the extorted confession is excluded only because and
to the extent that it is unreliable. But where are all the fine arguments of
public policy that many of these same courts expressed when the issue involved
evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure? Is there not an equal need
to discourage "third degree" methods, by excluding not only the complete
confession but also all knowledge gained as a result of it?2 1 Does not the
court "ratify the illegal means" when it receives evidence discovered as a
result of an extorted confession or receives confessions procured by trickery?
Could it be significant that this rule grew up almost entirely in murder and
robbery cases, while the federal rule, in its greatest growth, was the stepchild of Prohibition?
But in a leading case on the confession question in the United States
Supreme Court, Bran v. United States,232 the Court sowed the seeds from
which there yet may grow another "dangerous heresy". For, with a remarkable lack of historical accuracy, the. Court declared that the exclusion
of confessions (other than spontaneous utterances made to relieve the conscience) results from the Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.
The case, on its facts, appears to be a square holding that a confession induced
by a trick will be excluded. 233 But there are still deeper implications to be
found in the opinion and in its adoption of the self-incrimination theory. It
may require only a Supreme Court decision, following out these implications,
to start the parade for a new "federal rule" excluding not only the entire
sistent cases on analogous points leave this anomalous result: If an officer unlawfully
searches a man and finds a gun, it is admissible. Williams v. State, supra. If he

compels the man to tell him that he has a gun, and then finds it, it is admissible.
Rusher v. State, supra. But if he forces the man to hand over the gun, it is forcing
him to give evidence against himself and is excluded! Evans v. State, 106 Ga.
519, 32 S. E. 659 (1899).
'McKinney v. State, 134 Ala. 134, 32 So. 726 (1902); State v. McKean, 36 Iowa
343 (1873) ; People v. Barker, 60 Mich. 277, 27 N. W. 539 (1886); Heldt v. State,

20 Neb. 492, 30 N. W. 626 (1886); Commonwealth v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 122 Atd.
161 (1923); Wright v. State, 7 Tex. App. 574 (1880).
There is some doubt as to the federal courts. Brain v. United States, 168 U. S.

532, 18 Sup. Ct. 183 (1897), which excluded a confession, could be interpreted as a
deception case, since it dgclares that if, but for inducement, defendant would have
remained silent, the communication is inadmissible even though it takes the form of a
denial ("He could not have seen me") from which guilt is inferred. Cf. Lefkowitz
v. United States, 52 F. (2d) 52 (C. C. A. 2d 1931), in which an officer induced a
prisoner to write her name without revealing that it was to be used in evidence;
the court doubts, but does not pass upon, its admissibility.
And see Smith v. State, 88 Ga. 628, 15 S. E. 675 (1895) (doubting the inadmissibility
of a tricked confession, but finding other evidence sufficient).
Similarly, the fact that a confession reaches the court through a gross breach of
faith by an agent or confidant does not exclude it. Rex v. Derrington, 2 Car. & P.
418, 172 Eng. Rep. 189 (1826) ; Rex v. Shaw, 6 Car. & P. 372, 172 Eng. Rep. 1282 (1834).
m'Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 383, 40 Sup. Ct. 182 (1920).
'168 U. S. 532, .18 Sup. Ct. 183 (1897).
'See supra note 230. Cf. Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261
(1921) (search procured by means of fraud is equivalent to one with force).
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statement of the defendant but also the facts discovered thereby.23 4 There
are already a few lonesome bell-ringers for this rule in those courts which
exclude the results of compulsory medical examinitions and forcible comparison of shoe tracks with the defendant's feet or shoes. 23 5 The Brain case
contains the seeds of a heresy fully as dangerous as did the Boyd case.236
Let us hope that it has fallen upon barren ground, as now seems to be the
23 7
case.
It appears, therefore, that none of the arguments so eloquently propounded
in the search and seizure cases have been accepted by the courts of a great
majority of jurisdictions when the question of illegal arrest or extorted
confession was before them. 238 When a person is unlawfully arrested,
whether within or without the state, whether the kidnapping is effected by
private persons or by the connivance of the governor himself, a federal court
and nearly every state court will take jurisdiction if the person is before it.
When a person is brutally beaten by the police and a confession is extorted
which leads to discovery of other facts, all courts will receive ihese facts.
But when the question is search and seizure, nearly half the courts of this
country declare that they will not receive either the evidence so obtained
or any evidence discovered as a result thereof! We submit that the courts
should recognize in these latter cases, as they have in the others, that two
evils cannot be set off against each other.
IV.

REMEDIES

Repeated reference has been made to "direct remedies" which will be more
appropriate to prevent and to punish illegal enforcement. But it is said
that these remedies are ineffective. If so, the Legislature or its good right
arm, the Law Revision Commission, should make a thorough study of the
problem of devising effective direct remedies, to make the constitutional
guaranty "a real, not an empty blessing". We can here only make suggestions, for we have made no study.
Let us look first to the civil remedy. If it is true, as the Weeks case239

'No federal case squarely in point has been found in the digests later than 1823.
United States v. Richard, Fed. Cas. No. 16154 (C. C. D. C. 1823) (following the
orthodox view).
'See note in this issue. (1939) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 437.
'Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1886).
'A ray of hope may be seen in Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 31 Sup. Ct. 2
(1910), holding (per Justice Holmes) that the privilege against self-incrimination does
not exclude testimony as to the forcible trying on of a blouse. But the case relies
on the Adams case, and much water has passed under the bridge since then.
'It is not readily understandable why the courts should line up as they do on ,these
three closely related questions. Not one of the courts that exclude search and seizure
evidence is found among the few that dissent on the other rules, while the dissenters
on the arrest question (Kansas and Nebraska) and on the question of showing knowledge by confessions (Louisiana and possibly Georgia) are all among those that admit
evidence obtained by illegal search and seizure!
'Supra note 89.
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insists, that (unless the indirect remedy is applied) the Constitutional protection "is of no value" and "might as well be stricken from the Constitution",
then likewise the common law sanctions for the trespasses of private individuals are "of no value".2 0 For the remedy is identical. When a man is
illegally arrested, when his home is illegally invaded and his property
seized, when the police abuse him in an effort to extort a confession, he is
entitled to the same civil remedies as any other person whose rights have
been violated. The officer who arrests or searches without a warrant, or
who abuses a prisoner, the prosecutor who connives at such acts, and the
person who swears out a warrant without probable cause may all be sued
for damages, and punitive damages may be awarded.2 1 This is the right
of innocent and guilty alike, but it is obvious that a jury will not render any
substantial verdict against an officer if he is lucky enough to uncover a crime
by his unlawful acts. But is it not true that, in actions for damages, an
act is always judged by its results? Socially speaking, the criminal whose
crime is revealed has not suffered the same damages as the law-abiding citizen
who has been subjected to the indignities of an arrest and a search of his
home. 242 When a man who later proves to be guilty is arrested or searched,

the ju-y may render a small verdict (if any), which will have little effect
in discouraging the officers, although it may. cover all the socially recognized
damage suffered by the victim. 243

But when the rights of an innocent man

are wilfully violated by police and prosecutors, it is not to be supposed that
jurors are so lacking in respect for the sanctity of personal liberty that they
will not do adequate justice and make the offender regret his acts so that
he will seriously consider a change in policy.2 44
But, unfortunately, few police officers accumulate very substantial fortunes,
and judgments against them may avail little. Garnishment of the *government
"See State v. Dillon, 34 N. M. 366, 370, 281 Pac. 474, 476 (1929).

'The clasic cases are Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 95 Eng. Rep.
807 (1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (1763); Leach
v. Money, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001 (1765). The largest verdict in these cases was

one for £5000 against Lord Halifax, who issued the illegal warrants.
See also Snead v. Bonnoil, 166 N. Y. 325, 59 N. E. 899 (1901)

($500 verdict

against officer making an illegal arrest upheld); Johnson v. Comstock, 14 Hun 238
(1878) (officer protected by warrant fair on its face, but person who swore out
search warrant without cause held liable for $1000 punitive damages).
""'He who has voluntarily made his home a den of thieves, a distillery for the
manufacture of contraband liquor, a warehouse for infernal machines, or a safety

deposit box for forged documents or counterfeit coins, has not sustained the same
damages when its sanctity is invaded, as has the citizen who has maintained that
sanctity." Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019, 1021 (1925) (italics
supplied).
'At least eighteen states have gone so far as to say that an arrest is not unlawful
at all if it develops that the one arrested has committed a felony, even though the
arresting officer was ignorant of it at the time. See supra note 46.
'""We do not know whether the public, represented by its juries, is today more
indifferent to its liberties than it was when the immunity was born."
in People v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 24, 150 N. E. 585, 589 (1926).

Cardozo, J.,
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by which they are employed is generally not allowed, in the absence of special
statutory provision. 245 The government cannot be sued for the tort of a police
officer or prosecutor, for their duties are governmental and the rule of
respondeat superior does not apply. 246 Where official bonds are required
to be filed, there is a possibility of an action on the bond, but strict construction of the bonds and narrow views as to the parties for whose benefit the
247
bond was given have generally frustrated such action.
We must devise more effective means, of enforcing civil judgments against
the officers, by garnishment or otherwise. 248 An overhauling of official bonds
and the statutes relating thereto might give a more valuable remedy; the
terms of the bonds might well be adjusted so that the officer will be indemnified for violations in good faith but will bear the ultimate liability, to the
limit of his means, if he wilfully violates the law. 249 This would make possible
reparation to the victim of the wrong in all cases, would discourage officers
from committing wilful wrongs, but would not compel them to act at their
peril in performing their duties in good faith.
An alternative would be to provide a remedy against the government by
which the officer is employed. 250 Difficulties might be encountered with principles of agency, unless the remedial law were so expressed as to assume
responsibility for acts in excess of authority. This would provide reparation, but it would hardly discourage the officer, for there would be a tendency
for the government to absorb the loss and not pass it on to the offending
officer or prosecutor. A private bondsman would feel no such inhibitions and
the cost of wilful law violation would fall where it should.
The individual wronged has a right, in addition, to sue for the return of
his property, whether it was lawfully or unlawfully seized. But if it is held
-6 MCQUILLIN, MUNCIc'AL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1937) § 2681; Hall, The Law of
Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems (1936) 3 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 345,
346-7. See cases cited in both sources.
'6 McQuiLLIN, op. cit. supra note 245, § 2591; Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 229, 240-1; David, Municipal Liability in Tort in California
(1934) 7 So. CAL. L. REv. 295, 302-4; Hall, loc. cit. supra note 245 at 347-8; (1925) 11
VA. L. REV. 315. Recovery has been allowed in Canada. McSorley v. City of St. John,
6 Can. Sup. Ct. 531 (1881).
'-It is not the purpose of this article to go deeply into these matters. For a
full discussion, see Hall, loc. cit. supra note 245 at 346-53. In general, where the
abuse is most flagrant-arrest without process-the officer is held to be acting individually and his bondsman is not liable. 6 McQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 245, § 2592.
"Some states, by statute, permit garnishment of their salaries. ARIz. REV. CODE
(Courtright Supp. 1934) §§ 4277 a-e; CoLo. STAT. ANN. (Michie 1935), CODE CIv. PRoc.
C. 7, §§ 131-132 A.
"Combining, that is, some features of both liability insurance, in which the bondsman
would bear the loss, and a surety bond, in which he recovers over against the officer.
'See N. Y. CT. CLAIMS ACT § 12-a (waiver of immunity by state for torts of
officers). Cf. Matter of Evans v. Berry, 262 N. Y. 61, 186 N. E. 203 (1933) (New
York City ordinance authorizing Board of Estimate to make awards, in its discretion,
to those injured by police in making arrests; held constitutional as recognition of a
moral obligation, not a gratuity; but it rests upon grace and does not confer legal
right to compel compensation).
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in good faith to be used as evidence in a criminal proceeding, the individual's
right of possession is postponed until the needs of justice are satisfied.25 '
He may at once recover whatever property is not found by the court to be
of evidentiary value, but must await the final disposition of the case before
he can recover the balance (except under the federal rule, where his
possessory right is made superior to the requirements of criminal justice
unless the original seizure was proper).
The criminal penalties which are provided for oppressive acts of enforce25 3
252
But prosecutions are rare.
ment officers are often, on paper, very severe.
The problem, therefore, is to translate the paper remedy into effective actuality. In all too many cases, the acts of which the officer is guilty were
done in pursuance of the established policy of the enforcement office, and
it is not to be expected that the prosecutor will proceed against him under
such circumstances. But a study should be made of the.possibility of devising
some summary proceeding in the nature of contempt, in which the court
would take the initiative, upon affidavits of the offended party calling the
wrong to its attention, and upon a hearing of the officer, without the intervention of the prosecutor.2 54 There would be procedural questions to be
'United States v. Wilson, 163 Fed. 338 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1908) ; State v. Magnano,
97 Conn. 543, 117 Atl. 550 (1922); Azparren v. Ferrel, 44 Nev. 157, 191 Pac. 571
(1920) ; Simpson v. St. John, 93 N. Y. 363 (1883) ; Smith v. Jerome, 42 Misc. 22, 93
N. Y. Supp. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1905) (Gaynor, J.); Welchek v. State, 93 Tex. Cr. 271,
247 S. W. 524 (1922).
"Arrests and 4eizures without a warrant (or justification for acting without one),
and abuse of authority in executing a warrant are misdemeanors in New York. PENAL
LAW §§ 1846, 1847. The maximum penalty is one year in jail, $500 fine, or both.
PENAL LAW § 1937.
For searches (without a warrant) of private dwellings (or of any other property
if done maliciously and without probable cause), the federal law provides $1000 maximum
fine; and for a second offense, the same fine or a year in jail, or both. 18 U. S. C. A.
§ 53a (Supp. 1938).
For exceeding authority in executing a warrant, $1000 fine
or one year or both. 18 U. S. C. A. § 631 (1927).
Wire-tapping by any person, including a federal or state officer, is now. a federal
felony punishable by a maximum fine of $10,000 or two years in jail, or both. 47 U. S.
C. A. §§ 501, 605 (Supp. 1938).
Unlawful arrest abroad and return to this country without extradition was held
to be a kidnapping, irrespective of its purpose to return the fugitive to justice, and
extradition of the offending officer to Mexico for prosecution for this offense was
allowed in Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F. (2d) 503 (C. C. A. 5th 1934). By Statute
in New York, it is further made a felony for an officer of this state to turn a man over
to the agents of another state, even under a valid extradition warrant, until he has
first been taken before a court, been informed of the charges and of his rights, and
been given an opportunity to contest the legality of the proceeding if he will. N. Y.
CODE C.mI.
PROC. §§ 838, 839; UNIFORM ClRMINAL EXTRADITION AcT §§ 10, 11 (see
infra note 268 for states which have adopted this act). A mandatory one-year sentence
is provided.
2m In State v. Wagstaff, 115 S. C. 198, 105 S. E. 283 (1920), a police officer, and the
chief who stood by, were convicted of criminal assault for seizing a grip and searching
it unlawfully. This is probably an unusual case; and the punishment decreed is not
stated in the report.
Annotations to the statutes imposing such penalties are conspicuous by their absence.
"For an illustration of the use of the contempt procedure where practical reasons
make criminal punishment impossible, see United States v. Shipp, 203 U. S. 563, 27
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determined, as to just what formalities and safeguards would be desired.
And, while abuses in the execution of warrants of the court are probably
within the constitutional scope of contempt of court, 255 arrests and searches
without any warrant would seem not to be (despite one dictum suggesting
the contrary 256 ). The question would then have to be studied whether this
summary proceeding, without formal indictment or information, could constitutionally be applied to such acts by means of a statutory implication of a
waiver of this guaranty by persons becoming or continuing members of the
police force.
Probably a fine would be more effective than imprisonment as a remedy,
in any case, for if a sentence were imposed, there are "very serious doubts
257
whether the marshall would ever be compelled to live upon jail fare".
It should be provided in that event that the fine imposed might not be paid
directly or indirectly from the budget of the enforcement office.
Another effective remedy, if means can be devised for enforcing it independently of the prosecutor's control, would be forfeiture of the office or
employment of anyone, from the prosecutor on down, who wilfully and
habitually engages in illegal practices, and ineligibility for later election or
employment in the enforcement office. 258

But how this may be enforced

is a problem that would require study. We can only pose the problems.
The Legislature might better study these problems than seek to provide
"indirect remedies" of doubtful effectiveness and propriety.
But there is one type of "indirect remedy" that is to be encouraged. That
is to strike at the very roots of the problem and remove some of the causes
of illegal enforcement, particularly with respect to arrest. We need a realistic
reappraisal of long outmoded rules as to arrest.2 59 When it is recognized
just what arrests represent true abuses of the police power, it will be more
Sup. Ct. 165 (1906); s. c., 214 U. S. 386. 29 Sup. Ct. 637 (1909) (original contempt
proceeding in Supreme Court against leaders of mob which lynched prisoner after
Supreme Court had granted an appeal).
2'Cf. United States v. Hoffman, 13 F. (2d) 269 (N. D. I1. 1925), aff'd, 13 F. (2d)
278 (C. C. A. 7th 1926) ; Westbrook v. United States, 13 F. (2d) 280 (C. C. A. 7th
1926). In these cases, the sheriff to whom federal prisoners had been committed
under a court order, and the jailer (although acting under the sheriff's orders), were
adjudged guilty of a contempt in permitting the prisoners to leave the jail. It would
seem that improper execution of a search warrant or of a warrant of arrest would
fall in the same category. And see In re Chin Y. Shue, 199 Fed. 282 (D. Mass. 1912),
which implies that such a remedy would be available except that the offenders there.
were customs officers executing a warrant issued by the revenue commissioner and
not by the court.
'See State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 238, 125 Atl. 636, 640 (1924).
'7Hall, Evidence and the Fourth Amendment (1922) 8 A. B. A. J. 646, 647.
2rThe exclusion camp in the late Constitutional Convention, as a dying gesture
or perhaps as a test of the good faith of their opponents, proposed such an amendment
but it was defeated on the ground that it was a matter for the Legislature to decide.
CONVENTION REcORD (N.

Y. 1938) 620.

:'See articles cited supra notes 4 and 186.
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possible to cope with the problem, and the present too general contempt of
the police for the rules may be overcome.
In the field of interstate crime, much progress has been made toward the
ideal of "free trade" in criminals. 2 60 The Uniform Fresh Pursuit Act,.
adopted in at least half the states, 261 permits officers of another state, provided it makes reciprocal provisions, to continue a close pursuit over a
state line after a fleeing felon and to have the same authority to make the
arrest that a local officer would have if the crime had been committed in his
own state, provided the captive is taken immediately before a magistrate
to determine, not his guilt or innocence, but the lawfulness of the arrest.
But it is still necessary to obtain extradition, except that New York, as
to the states which make reciprocal provisions, permits immediate removal
after the hearing before the magistrate, eliminating extradition entirely in
the case of close pursuit. 262

This is a step in the right direction, for the

simpler the extradition process is made, preserving its safeguards but eliminating the "red tape", the less the temptation to ignore it entirely. The
permission to out-of-state officers to make arrests would have shocked an
earlier age, when such acts were looked upon as little short of an armed
invasion. Today, when criminals range freely among the states, we must
give "full faith and credit" to the officers of our neighbors, provided they
do what they would have to do at home, take the prisoner at once before
a magistrate.
An attack on the same problem from another angle has been made by
Congress in the Fleeing Felon Law,2 63 which makes it a federal offense to
travel in interstate commerce with intent to avoid prosecution for certain
named felonies. 264 Thus, the renowned "G-Men" take up at the state line
the chase of those wanted for the more serious crimes. The statute provides
for trial where the original crime was alleged to have been committed, so, by
the process of removal from one federal judicial district to another, much
simpler and more certain than extradition, 26 5 the fugitive is returned to
'See Osler, J., in It re Parker, 9 Ont. Prac. R. 332, 335 (1882).
'See (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 705. The Act was not proposed by the Commissioners
on Uniform Laws, but by the Interstate Commission on Crime, and hence the text is
not found in the U. L. A.
'N. Y. CODE CRim. PRoc. § 860, adopted in 1936. No states making reciprocal provisions have been found, however. New York also broadened the act as to crimes covered
-all acts which are crimes under our laws, rather than just felonies.
The same result has been achieved by interstate compact, under the permission of
Congress, 18 U. S. C. A. § 420 (Supp. 1938), among Colorado, New Mexico, and
Wyoming, permitting each other's officers to arrest fugitives with no formalities
but their own authority, waiving all requirements of extradition. Although Kansas
did not acdept this part of the compact, the full text is found in KANS. GEN. STAT.
(1935) § 62-2503.
118 U. S. C. A. § 408c (Supp. 1938), 48 STAT. 782 (1934).
'Murder, kidnapping, burglary, robbery, mayhem, rape, assault with a dangerous
weapon, or extortion accompanied by threats of violence, or attempt to commit any
of these crimes.
218 U. S. C. A. § 591 (1927). Removal between federal districts is very informal.
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the state where he is wanted for the original crime. And it is tacitly understood that upon his return he will be turned over to the state authorities for
prosecution for the original, more serious offense. 266
The simplification of interstate arrest under these various statutes-which
preserve the safeguard of an immediate hearing where the accused is foundremoves much of the temptation to unlawful arrests in other states. Another
major temptation, resulting from the non-extraditability of those who were
not in the state where the crime was consummated, has been attacked from
two angles. Under the leadership of Wisconsin 267 and the sponsorship of
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,268 the gap in the Constitution
has been filled by state statutes providing for the extradition of non-fugitives.
Thus, the man who shoots across the state line or defrauds another without
entering the state may be returned under the forms of law and is no
longer granted an immunity that could be overcome only by kidnapping him.
Alternatively, or in addition, some statutes now provide that where a force
is set in motion or a duty omitted, within the state, which results in the
consummation of a crime in another state, it is punishable in the former
state just as if the whole crime had been completed there.269 Thus, the
The prisoner is identified as the person named in a federal indictment, and the district
judge signs a removal order, the indictment itself being prima facie evidence that the
prisoner is charged with crime in another state.
'See United States v. McClure, 15 Fed. Supp. 931 (E. D. Tenn. 1936). On
the constitutionality of the Act, see Brabner-Smith, The Commerce Clause and the
New Federal "Extradition!" Statute (1934) 29 ILL. L. Rxv. 335. The practice of
removal to the jurisdiction for a federal offense followed by trial in the state court for
another crime was justified by analogy tQ the Lascelles case supra note 25, in In re
Little, 129 Mich. 454, 89 N. W. 38, 57 L. R. A. 295 (19025.
"L. 1919, c. 559. Wisconsin modified its statute in accordance with the Uniform
Act in 1933. Wis. STAT. (1933) § 364.06.
U
N1Fonc CalmxiNAL EXTRADITION Acr § 6, adopted in Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona,

California, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, Wyoming. But New York, to protect residents who had not been in the
demanding state, added a proviso that the crime charged must be such as would be a
crime under its own laws and that the Governor may, in his discretion, make the
surrender conditional on the granting of immunity from prosecution for other crimes
until the prisoner has had an opportunity to leave after aquittal or after serving his
term; and its section does not apply to libel. N. Y. CODE Cmdr. Paoc. § 834. The
Uniform Act changes' the rule of the second case of State v. Hall, 115 N. C. 811 (1899),
supra note 7.
"This changes the rule of the first case of State v. Iall, 114 N. C. 909 (1904),
supra note 7. A pioneer in this regard was California. People v. Botkin, 132 Cal.
231, 64 Pac. 286 (1901) (poisoned candy mailed from California to Delaware, where
recipient ate it and died; held to be a murder triable in California). See e.g., ALA. CODE
ANN. (Michie 1928) § 4893; CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering 1937) § 27; MicH. Comp.
LAws (1929) § 17126; N. Y. PENAL LAw § 1930; Wis. STAT. (1937) § 353.29. Larremore, Inadequacy of the Present Federal Statute Regulating Interstate Rendition
(1910) 10 COL. L. REv. 208, n. 2, says that a majority of the states have so provided.
Reid, Interstate Rendition for Extra-Territorial Crimes (1920) A. B. A. REP. 432,
expresses the view that this is the less effective of the two remedies, for those most
interested in a prosecution are far away.
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absentee criminal, immune from extradition in the absence of special statute,
becomes liable to prosecution in the state of his residence.
Perhaps the most effective remedy of all has yet to be mentioned. Law
enforcement officers are peculiarly sensitive to the power of the press. When
newspapers begin to editorialize on their failure to solve a notorious crime,
the police "get on their toes". (Sometimes, in their anxiety to "solve" the
crime and placate the clamor of the press, they also get on the toes of innocent
victims.) Of late the press has been demanding in editorials that these
criminals be released in the face of evidence of their guilt, if the seizure
of such evidence was improper. If the newspapers would devote their
energies and their facilities to an unbiased investigation of the true situation
in illegal enforcement in each city-illegal arrests, search and seizure, and
the "third degree"-and would'then concentrate on arousing public opinion
by turning the white light of publicity on the practices, wherever and if
ever they exist, if they would put pressure on prosecutors to cease encouraging such practices and to discharge or discipline offending officers, and if they
would tell the public at election time whether the prosecutor has been
careless of individtial rights and liberties, they could accomplish a great
and constructive public service. At present the public may only make its
choice between highly dramatized but poorly supported assertions on the
one side and categorical denials of the prosecutors on the other.2 70 Facts and
figures, gathered and presented by newspapers respected for their integrity,
and driven home to the public in an active campaign to improve the quality
of law enforcement, could do much to end the practices if and where they
exist or to still the clamor of the exclusionists if the evil is not all that is
claimed.
If these remedies, or some of them, were applied and proved effective,
the questidn of using evidence illegally obtained or of trying the prisoner
illegally arrested would seldom arise. But when it did arise, there could be
only one answer. The release of one criminal in the face of evidence of his
guilt is never a proper remedy for the wrong of another. If effective direct
remedies are devised, as we believe they can be, none can claim that it is
a necessary remedy. Its indirect effect in discouraging illegal enforcement
may-or may not-be of great value. But the consequences to society of
releasing accused criminals, not because they have been denied a fair trial
but because of the wholly collateral wrong committed in apprehending them
'°Cf. People v. Mummiani, 258 N. Y. 394, 398-403, 180 N. E. 94, 95-98 (1932), in
which Judge Lehman (Cardozo, C. J., and Pound, J., concurring) declares that it is
the prosecutor's duty to explain the circumstances of the obtaining of a confession
and not leave the jury to choose blindly between the highly interested assertions of
the accused and the categorical denials of the police. (The case presents an interesting dilemma, for these three judges voted to reverse on this ground, while one,
disagreeing on this point, found another error. The case was reversed, four to three,
but no majority agreed on any particular error. What was the trial court to do?)
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or in discovering their crime, are too great to justify this indirect attack on
the problem.
Our conclusion could not be better expressed than in the language of the
late Justice Cardozo:
"The law . . . is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged
with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every
concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may
be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the
accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not
be strained
until it is narrowed to a filament. We must keep the balance
327 1
true."
"'Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 122, 54 Sup. Ct. 330, 338 (1934) (the case
held due process was not denied when defendant was not present at a "view"). Italics
the writer's.

